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Plata v. Brown and Realignment:
Jails, Prisons, Courts, and Politics
Margo Schlanger*
INTRODUCTION
The year 2011 marked an important milestone in American institutional
reform litigation. That year, a bare majority of the U.S. Supreme Court, in
an opinion in Brown v. Plata by Justice Anthony Kennedy, affirmed a dis-
trict court order requiring California to remedy its longstanding constitu-
tional deficits in prison medical and mental health care by reducing prison
crowding.' Not since 1978 had the Court ratified a lower court's crowding-
related order in a jail or prison case,2 and the order before the Court in 2011
was fairly aggressive; theoretically, it could have (although this was never a
real prospect) induced the release of tens of thousands of sentenced prisoners
or the expenditure of billions of dollars in new prison construction. Indeed,
Justice Scalia, in dissent, labeled the proceedings that produced the order "a
judicial travesty" and characterized the order itself as "perhaps the most
radical injunction issued by a court in our Nation's history."'
The prison population order before the Court had been issued by a
unanimous three-judge district court in two longstanding federal civil rights
cases, Plata v. Brown and Coleman v. Brown, consolidated for consideration
of entry of such an order. The Plata/Coleman order requires California's
state prisons to limit prison population to 137.5% of the rated capacity of
California's prisons by the end of 2013;4 absent construction, that works out
to a bit under 110,000 prisoners - about equal to the state prison population
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. Thanks to the many participants in the Plata
and Coleman litigations who shared their time, expertise, and observations with me. A list is
included infra note 13. Thanks also for their helpful comments to Don Herzog, Mona Lynch,
Anjuli Verma, my Michigan colleagues who participated in our summer brown bag workshop,
and as always, to Sam Bagenstos. All remaining errors are, of course, mine.
'Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011).
2 Even in 1978, the crowding issue in Hutto v. Finney was not squarely before the Court
when it affirmed lower court orders banning the long-term use of punitive isolation and grant-
ing plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. See 437 U.S. 678, 680 (1978). Likewise, in Costello v. Wain-
wright, the Court did not squarely address the Florida prison population cap in that case.
Instead the Court held that only an ordinary district court, rather than a three-judge court, had
jurisdiction to issue such an order. See 430 U.S. 325, 326 (1977). Thus, it could be said that
the Supreme Court never, before Plata, affirmed a crowding order. Rather, the Court has been
deeply suspicious of crowding claims. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348-49 (1981);
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540-43 (1979).
Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1950-51 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
4 Id. at 1928.
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in mid-1993. 5 At its peak in 2007, California's prisoner total was over
173,000,6 with prisoners who could not fit in cells packed instead into con-
gregate spaces such as gyms. The picture below illustrates the result:
Source: California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation7
As this Article is finished in November 2012, sixteen months after the Platal
Coleman population order's effective date, the space pictured above is empty
of beds and is being used, as intended, as a gym. Many newly convicted
offenders who under prior rules would have come into the state system are
instead serving their time in county jails. Parole violators are also being
channeled to jails rather than prisons, and their numbers, altogether, have
dropped significantly. Driven by these and other changes, together labeled
"realignment," California's prison population is more than a quarter smaller
than that 2007 peak; currently, the state houses about 125,000 prisoners,
which puts the total population at about 147% of rated prison capacity; an
CAL. DEP'T OF CORR. AND REHAB., MONTHLY REPORT OF POPULATION AS OF MIDNIGHT
JUNE 30, 1993 (July 6, 1993), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports-Research/Offender
InformationServicesBranch/Monthly/TPOP1A/TPOP1Ad9306.pdf.
6 
CAL. DEP'T OF CORR. AND REHAB., MONTHLY REPORT OF POPULATION AS OF MIDNIGHT
AUGUST 31, 2007 (Sept. 5, 2007), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/ReportsResearch/Of-
fenderInformationServicesBranch/Monthly/TPOPlA/TPOP1AdO7O8.pdf
CAL. DEPT OF CORR. AND REHAB., THE FUTURE OF CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONS: A
BLUEPRINT TO SAVE BILLIONS OF DOLLARS, END FEDERAL COURT OVERSIGHT, AND IMPROVE
THE PRISON SYSTEM 5 (Apr. 23, 2012), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/2012plan/docs/
plan/complete.pdf (last visited July 6, 2012) [hereinafter CDCR, BLUEPRINT].
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additional 8,600 prisoners are housed out-of-state.8 All this was prompted
and enabled by the Plata/Coleman litigation, the population order the litiga-
tion produced, and the political processes that ensued. And the order (if it is
not amended) requires still more prison population reduction in the near fu-
ture: an additional decrease of nearly 15,000 - over 23,000 if the out-of-
state prisoners are brought back home, as the Governor has declared they
will be9 - by the middle of 2013.
This Article explores pertinent features of the relevant legal and politi-
cal ecosystem 0 in which these changes are taking place. Informed by court
documents," state reports and policy papers,12 and interviews," I trace the
litigation and policy that led to and that have followed the Supreme Court's
ruling affirming the Plata/Coleman population order. The result illustrates
the complex interplay of institutional reform litigation and political out-
comes and processes.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I sets out crucial background
about how a 1996 anti-prisoners'-rights federal statute, the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA), structures correctional civil rights litigation. Part II
'CAL. DEPT OF CORR. AND REHAB., WEEKLY REPORT OF POPULATION AS OF MIDNIGHT
OCTOBER 24, 2012 (Oct. 29, 2012), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/reports-research/of-
fenderinformationservicesbranch/WeeklyWed/TPOPIA/TPOPIAdl21O24.pdf.
9 See CDCR, BLUEPRINT, supra note 7, at 1, 28.
10 I thank Nick Bagley for this metaphor.
" Each of the court documents referred to is cited individually, but all are available at the
Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, a repository of information about institutional reform
cases. Documents related to the population issue are at Plata v. Brown / Coleman v. Brown
Three-Judge Court Proceedings, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id= 12280. See also
Plata v. Brown, 01-cv-01351 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 1990), available at http://www.clearing-
house.net/detail.php?id=589; Coleman v. Brown, 90-cv-00520 (E.D. Cal. June 6, 1994), avail-
able at http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=573.
12 Again, these are individually cited, but many are collected at http://www.CALRealign-
ment.org/.
13 Even when not quoted or cited further, the telephone interviews I conducted were enor-
mously helpful to the development of whatever insight this Article offers. Notes from all
interviews are on file with the author. They included: Kimberly Hall Barlow, Partner, Jones &
Mayer, Counsel for Law Enforcement Intervenors in Plata and Coleman (June 20, 2012);
Michael Bien, Partner, Rosen, Bien, Galvan & Grunfeld, and Class Counsel in Coleman (May
2, 2012); Matthew Cate, Sec'y, Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab. (July 17, 2012); Paul Comiskey,
former lawyer for the Prisoners' Rights Union (June 12, 2012); Bill Crout, former Deputy Dir.
& Acting Exec. Dir., Cal. Bd. of Corr. (June 11, 2012); Peter Eliasberg, Legal Dir., ACLU of
S. Cal. (July 20, 2012); Ernie Galvan, Partner, Rosen, Bien, Galvan & Grunfeld, and Class
Counsel in Coleman (May 1, 2012); John Hagar, attorney and former Assistant to the Plata
Receiver (June 9, 2012); Thelton Henderson, U.S. Dist. Judge in Plata (June 12, 2012); Rich-
ard Herman, former lawyer for the Prisoners' Rights Union (June 6, 2012); Sandra Hutchens,
Sheriff, Orange Cnty., Cal. (June 5, 2012); Clark Kelso, Receiver, Cal. Prison Med. Sys. (May
18, 2012); Barry Krisberg, Dir. of Research and Policy, Berkeley Law School Chief Justice
Earl Warren Inst. on Law and Soc. Policy (May 30, 2012); Don Specter, Dir., Prison Law
Office, and Class Counsel in Plata and Coleman (May 4, 2012); Dan Stormer, Partner, Had-
sell, Stormer, Richardson & Renick (July 6, 2012); Bob Takeshta, Deputy Dir., Cal. Bd. of
State and Cmty. Corr. (July 24, 2012); Nick Warner, Managing Partner, Warner & Pank (May
29, 2012); and Gary Wion, Deputy Dir., Cal. Corr. Standards Auth. (June 12, 2012). In addi-
tion, I also learned a great deal from the press accounts, interviews, and commentary collected
at http://califomiacorrectionscisis.blogspot.com.
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paints the relevant history of Plata and Coleman, in the district court and the
Supreme Court, focusing on the interaction of court procedure and politics
- describing, for example, how the litigation promoted a more explicit,
open, and elaborate multiparty bargaining process over prison population
and criminal justice policy; and how the focus during trial on public safety
actually increased prisoners' rights advocates' effectiveness outside of litiga-
tion. It analyzes Governor Jerry Brown's "realignment" plan - the state's
response to the Plata/Coleman population order, which shrinks the parole
population and shortens parole-revocation sentence terms, moves some clas-
ses of prisoners from state to county custody, and encourages counties to
consider nonincarcerative penalties for crime.
Part III looks at one of the key features of the environment in which
realignment is being implemented: pre-PLRA population court orders. I
demonstrate that contrary to Justice Scalia's rhetoric, population orders such
as the Plata/Coleman order have been very common in correctional civil
rights cases; in fact, some of these run-of-the-mill population orders are vital
parts of the ongoing story of California prison reform. In California, the
existing jail population orders, and the mindset that accompanies them, are
encapsulated by two (equivalent) rules of thumb - "One prisoner, one
bed," and "No floor sleepers." Currently covering about a third of Califor-
nia's jails and jail population, these orders have functioned for decades as
county-specific bail and jail sentencing reform mechanisms.14
Part IV concludes by examining the prospects of a litigation-focused
response to what I call the "hydra risk" - the very real possibility that
Plata and Coleman could succeed at chopping the head off of unconstitu-
tional conditions of prison confinement in California, only to cause fifty-
eight counties to develop unconstitutional conditions of jail confinement.
The one-prisoner-one-bed mindset substantially ameliorates, but does not
eliminate, the hydra risk. Going forward, it will be a huge challenge for
prisoners' rights advocates to find out what is going on in all the scattered
county jails, much less to seek remedies for the problems that may be uncov-
ered. Three types of litigation responses are likely: additional scrutiny of
jails in ongoing statewide prison litigation; new jail litigation; and the revi-
val of existing but more-or-less orphaned jail cases.
If California were a country, its prison and jail population would rank
ninth in the world." The partial reversal of its astronomical increase in
prison population (from under 25,000 in 1980 to over 170,000 in 200616) is
14 See infra notes 237-240 and accompanying text.
' The total California incarcerated population is currently nearly 200,000; ninth-ranked
South Africa incarcerates about 150,000 people. Entire World - Prison Population Totals,
INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR PRISON STUDIES, http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/
wpb stats.php?area=all&category=wb-poptotal (last visited Sept. 29, 2012).
6 See GEORGE HILL & PAIGE HARRISON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS
UNDER STATE OR FEDERAL JURISDICTION (Dec. 6, 2005), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
content/data/CORPOPO2.csv; CAL. DEPT OF CORR. AND REHAB., MONTHLY REPORT OF PoPu-
LATION AS OF MIDNIGIrr OCTOBER 31, 2006 (Nov. 2, 2006), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.
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important in its own right. But California's experience of partially litigated
reform also provides a concrete and therefore useful case study of some of
the ways in which institutional reform litigation actually works. I have in
other work lamented that decades of practical and scholarly experience with
institutional reform litigation has not adequately analyzed its causes, its suc-
cesses, and its failures. In particular, I have argued for lightening scholarly
emphasis on judges in favor of closer examination of the multi-player polit-
ics of institutional reform litigation." This Article is an effort to answer my
own prior invitation.
The Article contributes, as well, to an additional scholarly project: that
of paying closer attention to counties in criminal justice scholarship. Coun-
ties are widely acknowledged to be key American criminal justice players: it
is, after all, county district attorneys who prosecute and county judges who
sentence criminal offenders. Professors Franklin Zimring and Gordon Haw-
kins identify the resulting externality problem, describing state imprison-
ment as a "free lunch" for county political actors because counties do not
bear the incarceration costs of the state prisoners they create.'" Yet only a
small amount of scholarly work has dug into county-level trends and
processes to understand their dynamics and impact." Realignment's explicit
alteration of the county/state balance - shrinking the externalities to county
sentencing - is drawing augmented attention, including this piece.20
But although the analysis is fine-gauge, the scene was set by macro
trends in American criminal justice policy over the past four decades. The
United States is, it has become commonplace to observe, in the midst of the
largest criminal justice experiment ever undertaken. From 1930 to 1973,
American incarceration rates stayed stable enough to prompt articles by dis-
gov/ReportsResearch/Offender InformationServicesBranchtMonthly/TPOPl A/TPOP IAd
0610.pdf.
" Margo Schlanger, Beyond the Hero Judge: Institutional Reform Litigation as Litigation,
97 MICH. L. REV. 1994, 2033, 2036 (1999) [hereinafter Schlanger, Beyond the Hero Judge];
see also Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison
Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 550, 616-21 (2006) [hereinafter Schlanger, Civil Rights
Injunctions Over Time]. Welcome contributions by others include, e.g., Heather Schoenfeld,
Mass Incarceration and the Paradox of Prison Conditions Litigation, 44 LAW & Soc'Y REV.
731, 732 (2010); MONA LYNCH, SUNBELT JUSTICE: ARIZONA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN PUNISHMENT 174-207 (2010).
18 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT 211 (1991).
19 But see W. David Ball, Tough on Crime (on the State's Dime): How Violent Crime Does
Not Drive California Counties' Incarceration Rates - And Why It Should, 28 GA. ST. U. L.
REv. 987, 992-93 (2012) (providing citations to county-level studies of numerous aspects of
the criminal justice system).
20 Academic contributions include Anjuli Verma, Institutional Crisis and Local Criminal
Justice Work Groups (May 22, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Ball,
supra note 19; Angela McCray et al., Realigning the Revolving Door? An Analysis of Cali-
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tinguished academics postulating a "stability of punishment hypothesis." 2 1
Others predicted "the decline and likely fall of the 'prison' as that term is
now understood."22 But the "war on crime" accomplished a sea change:
beginning in 1973, and seemingly inexorably, the United States increased its
incarceration rate year by year by year, until, at what now seems to have
been the peak in 2009, our jails and prisons housed nearly 2.3 million people
on any given day - a national incarceration rate of 7.4 per thousand.23 We
incarcerate more people (and particularly more nonwhite men) than any
country in the world, at a rate that far outpaces our leading international
competitors, Rwanda, Georgia, and Russia.24 Perhaps the California story
told here is part of a long-overdue pivot in national incarceration trends, a
dialing back of this unfortunate piece of American exceptionalism.
I. BACKGROUND: THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT
Prompted by increasing prisoner civil rights litigation (itself the result
of skyrocketing prisoner populations) 25 and by accounts of criminal mayhem
caused by court-ordered prison and jail population caps,2 6 Congress enacted
the lawsuit-limiting Prison Litigation Reform Act2 7 (PLRA) in 1996, one of
21 Alfred Blumstein & Soumyo Moitra, An Analysis of the Time Series of the Imprison-
ment Rate in the States of the United States: A Further Test of the Stability of Punishment
Hypothesis, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 376 (1979); see generally Alfred Blumstein &
Jacqueline Cohen, A Theory of the Stability of Punishment, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198
(1973).
22 Norval Morris, Prison in Evolution, 29 FED. PROBATION 20, 20 (1965). I was alerted to
this essay by ROBERT PERKINSON, TEXAS TOUGH: THE RISE OF AMERICA'S PRISON EMPIRE 3
(2010).
23 LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATION IN THE
UNrrED STATES 2010 3, 6 (2011), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpusl0.pdf.
24 The International Centre for Prison Studies puts Rwanda at 5.3 per thousand, Georgia at
5.1, and Russia at 5.0 per thousand. INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR PRISON STUDIES, ENTIRE
WORLD - PRISON POPULATION RATES PER 100,000 OF THE NATIONAL POPULATION, available
at http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/wpbstats.php?area=all&category=wb-pop
rate (last visited June 19, 2012).
" See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARv. L. REv. 1555, 1565 (2003) [here-
inafter Schlanger, Inmate Litigation]; Anne Morrison Piehl & Margo Schlanger, Determinants
of Civil Rights Filings in Federal District Court by Jail and Prison Inmates, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 79, 84 (2004).
26 Brief for the State of Louisiana et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 27-32,
Schwarzenegger v. Plata, No. 09-1233 (U.S. 2011), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/
chDocs/public/PC-CA-0057-0037.pdf. The lawsuit that looms the largest in the legislative
history of the PLRA's population order provisions was Harris v. City of Philadelphia, No. 82-
1847 (E.D. Pa. filed Apr. 1982); see generally Harris v. Pernsley, 654 F. Supp. 1042 (E.D. Pa.
1987), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=231. For a summary of the
role this case played in the PLRA's passage, see Brief for the State of Louisiana et al., supra,
and sources cited. The ACLU distinguished the Harris decree from the Plata/Coleman popu-
lation order in its amicus brief. See Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Anici
Curiae at 7-8, Schwarzenegger v. Plata, No. 09-1233 (U.S. 2011), available at http://www.
clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-CA-0057-0092.pdf.
27 Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 (1996) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2006); 18 U.S.C.
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the few legislative results of Newt Gingrich's Contract with America.28 I
have previously described in depth the many ways in which the PLRA made
old correctional court orders more difficult for plaintiffs' counsel to sustain
and new ones more difficult to get. 29 Here, I examine population orders
more particularly - what the PLRA labels "prisoner release order[s]" and
defines as orders with "the purpose or effect of reducing or limiting the
prison population, or that direct[ ] the release from or nonadmission of pris-
oners to a prison."3 0
Procedure: The PLRA eliminates the authority of a single district judge
to enter a population order. Instead, such an order can be entered only by a
three-judge district court.' The three-judge court procedure emphasizes the
seriousness of the subject matter, guards against the danger of a runaway
judge, and comes with heightened (and speedier) appellate review: appeal
from the final judgment of a three-judge court lies directly and as of right to
the U.S. Supreme Court.32 In addition, the PLRA greatly expands the access
to population-order proceedings of a variety of criminal justice stakeholders,
granting intervention rights to state and local officials, including legislators,
prosecutors, and jail and prison officials.33 This multiplication of parties
makes settlement much more complex.
Prerequisites: The PLRA instructs the three-judge court not to enter a
population order unless a prior, less intrusive order "has failed to remedy the
deprivation of the Federal right sought to be remedied."3 4 In addition, the
court must first find by clear and convincing evidence that "crowding is the
primary cause of the violation of a Federal right," and that "no other relief
will remedy the violation of the Federal right."" Courts are told, as well, to
"give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the opera-
tion of a criminal justice system caused by the relief,"3 6 although they are
offered no instructions about how to perform this balancing.
Scope: Once a three-judge court decides a population order is appropri-
ate, the PLRA governs the scope of that order: for population orders as for
all other prospective relief, entry of relief must be accompanied by a finding
"that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to
correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means
§§ 3624, 3626 (2006); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1915, 1915A, 1932 (2006); 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1997a-1997h (2006)).2 8
REPUBLICAN NATL COMM., CONTRACT wrTH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REPRESEN-
TATIVE NEWT GINGRICH, REPRESENTATIVE DICK ARMEY, AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO
CHANGE THE NATION 53 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994).
2 Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time, supra note 17, at 554.
30 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(4).
" Id. at § 3626(a)(3)(B).
3228 U.S.C. § 1253.
3 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(F).
3 Id. at § 3626(a)(3)(A)(i).
" Id. at § 3626(a)(3)(E).36 Id. at § 3626(a)(1)(A).
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necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right."3 7 These limits are
consonant with ordinary remedial principles for litigated relief, but their ap-
plication by the PLRA to prison and jail civil rights settlements was a nota-
ble innovation.38
Termination: The PLRA makes any court-enforceable, prospective re-
lief in a prison or jail conditions case, including a population order, termina-
ble on the motion of the defendant or intervenor. The motion to terminate
can be made as soon as two years after relief is entered and must be granted
unless the court makes written findings that the relief "remains necessary to
correct a current and ongoing violation" of the plaintiffs' federal rights, and
is narrowly tailored.3 9 The PLRA thus empowers defendants - and the
broad group of criminal justice officials whom the Act allows to intervene as
of right - to relitigate frequently the need for a population order, whether
or not entered on consent. (The statutory right to seek termination can, how-
ever, be waived in advance in a settlement.4 0) It is important to note that
even though this provision of the PLRA makes termination relatively easy to
secure, defendants still might not seek it. First, as explored below, prison or
jail officials may serve operational or political goals by remaining subject to
court order. In addition, a defendant's motion to terminate can open up a
dormant case to more active litigation, when plaintiffs oppose the motion
and begin discovery and other preparation for a termination hearing.41 The
PLRA's hurdles to entry of new population orders - such as the one before
the Supreme Court in Brown v. Plata - exacerbate these effects.
II. PLATA AND COLEMAN
The case on appeal as Brown v. Plata in the Supreme Court combined
one case most recently captioned Coleman v. Brown and another most re-
cently known as Plata v. Brown.
37 Id.
31 See Schlanger, Beyond the Hero Judge, supra note 17, at 2010-11; Schlanger, Civil
Rights Injunctions Over Time, supra note 17, at 594-95. See, e.g., Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk
Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 389 (1992) (explaining that injunctive settlements may extend well
past what might permissibly be entered in litigated decrees); Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986) ("[A] federal court is not necessa-
rily barred from entering a consent decree merely because the decree provides broader relief
than the court could have awarded after a trial.").
'9 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3).
4 See, e.g., Settlement Agreement at 17, State of Conn. Office of Prot. and Advocacy for
Persons with Disabilities v. Choinski, No. 03-cv-01352 (D. Conn. Mar. 8, 2004), available at
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-CT-0015-0001.pdf ("The parties agree not to
unilaterally seek to modify, extend, add to, terminate, or otherwise challenge this agreement,
under the Prison Legal Reform Act or otherwise, for the duration of the three-year enforce-
ment period.").
4' This has happened recently in Pederson v. Cnty. of Plumas, No. 89-cv-01659 (E.D. Cal.
Dec. 4, 1989), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id= 12199. The case had
been essentially dormant since 1992, but it may be reviving as a result of the sheriff's effort to
terminate a 1992 settlement setting a population cap of thirty-seven, in light of recent jail
expansion. Comiskey Interview, supra note 13; Stormer Interview, supra note 13.
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A. Prior to the Supreme Court
Coleman was filed in 1990 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California by a pro se prisoner, Ralph Coleman, who suffered
from serious mental illness. 42 Housed at the Pelican Bay prison, where just
one psychologist was assigned to treat any mental health needs of 3,500
prisoners, Coleman sought class action status for his suit and asked to be
transferred to a facility where he would have access to a psychiatrist.4 3
About a year later, Don Specter, the head of the Prison Law Office, a public
interest organization then located just outside the gate of San Quentin prison,
took on the case, along with other lawyers at his office, as well as Michael
Bien of Rosen, Bien, Galvan & Grunfeld, and others. After a three-month
trial, Chief Magistrate Judge John Moulds issued a scathing assessment of
California's mental health provision and found that the system imposed cruel
and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment;" the district
judge, Lawrence Karlton, agreed in 1995.45 The district court docket sheet
indexing the extensive litigation over remediation in the seventeen years
since has over 4,200 entries. 46
Plata is newer and was at first less contentious. Dealing with medical
care for state prisoners, it was filed in 2001 in the Northern District of Cali-
fornia by the Prison Law Office on behalf of nine named male prisoners and
a putative class of all prisoners then or in the future in the custody of the
California Department of Corrections. 47 There was, initially, no trial: the
State stipulated to the entry of injunctive relief in 2002, including the ex-
press, if opaque, concession that "the Court shall find that this Stipulation
satisfies the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A)" 48 - the provision
of the PLRA that forbids federally enforceable prospective settlements ab-
sent a finding that the settlement's terms are narrowly tailored to "correct the
42 Coleman v. Wilson, No. 90-cv-00520 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 1989), available at http:/www.
clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-CA-0002-9000.pdf.
43 Information about Ralph Coleman and his pro se request comes from Donald Specter,
Cruel and Unusual Punishment of the Mentally Ill in California's Prisons: A Case Study of a
Class Action Suit, 21 Soc. JusT. 109, 110 (1994).
" Findings and Recommendations at 28-31, Coleman v. Wilson, No. 90-cv-00520 (E.D.
Cal. June 6, 1994), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-CA-0002-
0035.pdf.
45 Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1323 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
46 The docket sheet is available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-CA-
0002-9000.pdf.
47 Complaint at 2, Plata v. Davis, No. 01-cv-01351 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2001), available at
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-CA-0018-0088.pdf. Until 2009, prisoners
confined at Pelican Bay State Prison were not part of the class because they were, instead,
class members of a single-prison litigation, Madrid v. Gomez. See Stipulation and [Proposed]
Order re Merger of Medical Health Care at Pelican Bay State Prison at 1-2, Plata v.
Schwarzenegger, No. 01-cv-01351 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2009), available at http://www.clearing-
house.net/chDocs/public/PC-CA-001 8-0083.pdf.
" Stipulation for Injunctive Relief at 15, Plata v. Davis, No. 0l-cv-01351 (N.D. Cal. June
13, 2002), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/publiclPC-CA-0018-0005.pdf.
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violation of [a] Federal right." The State thus effectively, though crypti-
cally, conceded in its stipulated injunction that the system's level of care was
constitutionally inadequate, evidencing systemic "deliberate indifference" 49
to the health of California's prisoners. As District Judge Thelton Henderson
explained three years later:
By all accounts, the California prison medical care system is bro-
ken beyond repair. The harm already done in this case to Califor-
nia's prison inmate population could not be more grave, and the
threat of future injury and death is virtually guaranteed in the ab-
sence of drastic action. . . . [I]t is an uncontested fact that, on
average, an inmate in one of California's prisons needlessly dies
every six to seven days due to constitutional deficiencies in the
[California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation's] medi-
cal delivery system. This statistic, awful as it is, barely provides a
window into the waste of human life occurring behind California's
prison walls due to the gross failures of the medical delivery
system.s0
This Article is not the occasion to detail the remedial sagas of either
Plata or Coleman, which would fill a small library.' (That is not to say that
the case is incapable of judicial management;52 in fact, in my view, the vol-
ume of court materials rather testifies to the care with which the litigation
has proceeded, and the expertise the cases have marshaled in service of more
humane incarceration.) My focus here is on the population issue. Both
Plata and Coleman saw early resolution of the issue of liability. Early in
both cases, the State either lost or conceded liability for systemic violations
of the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. The re-
sult in each was an extensive set of injunctive provisions, specifying goals
and methods of improving medical and mental health care. Subsequently in
both, the district courts appointed remedial assisters with extensive authority
- in Coleman, a special master (first, lawyer J. Michael Keating, and after
Keating retired, lawyer Matthew Lopes) and in Plata, a receiver (first, public
health expert Robert Sillen, and then law professor J. Clark Kelso). Both
Lopes and Kelso, as well as the plaintiffs, were by 2006 reporting that in-
creasing prison populations were frustrating their ability to effectuate com-
4 For the deliberate indifference standard, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-06
(1976).
50 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re Appointment of Receiver at 1, Plata v.
Schwarzenegger, No. 01-cv-01351 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2005), available at http://www.clearing-
house.net/chDocs/public/PC-CA-0018-0007.pdf.
5 For nearly all the dozens of opinions, see the case pages at the Civil Rights Litigation
Clearinghouse, supra note 11.
52 For a guide to the judicial competence debate relating to institutional reform litigation,
see, e.g., Michael W. McCann, Reform Litigation on Trial, 17 LAw & Soc. INQuIRY 715,
729-42 (1992).
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pliance with extant remedial court orders, or even with the underlying
constitutional requirements.
In October 2006, after several unavailing efforts to legislate various
solutions to overcrowding,53 Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger issued a for-
mal proclamation that the California prison system was facing a "State of
Emergency" dangerous to prisoners, correctional staff, and the public;5 4 state
law required such a proclamation as a prerequisite to contracting with pri-
vate or out-of-state facilities to house California prisoners. 5 The proclama-
tion included paragraph after paragraph of description of the deleterious
impact of crowding on health and security in California's prisons. The lead
lawyers in Plata and Coleman were, respectively, Don Specter, at the Prison
Law Office, and Michael Bien, at the private civil rights firm Rosen, Bien,
Galvan & Grunfeld. 6 Once they read the Governor's 2006 State of Emer-
gency document - which would obviously be admissible in court and
would undercut any effort by the State to minimize the results of prison
crowding - they decided it could tip the balance in their favor, notwith-
standing the federal Prison Litigation Reform Act and its limits on the entry
of new prison and jail population orders. If ever there was going to be a
post-PLRA contested population cap, they agreed after much consultation,
this would be it.5" In both cases (and in the Americans with Disabilities Act
prison class action, then captioned Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, in which
the same lawyers served as class counsel), they filed a motion seeking a
population order." Over the objection of the State, and after a joint motion
hearing, Judge Karlton and Judge Henderson decided that the plaintiffs had
made the showing required to convene a three-judge court; they each granted
the motion. 9 (In Armstrong, Judge Claudia Wilken denied the motion with-
s3 See, e.g., A.B. 2902, California Legislature, 2005-2006 Regular Session (2006); S.B.
901, California Legislature, 2005-2006 Regular Session (2005); A.B. 96, California Legisla-
ture, 2005-2006 Regular Session (2005); A.B. 1762, California Legislature, 2005-2006 Regu-
lar Session (2005).
5 Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of Cal., Prison Overcrowding State of Emergency
Proclamation (Oct. 4, 2006), available at http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=4278 (last visited
May 4, 2012).
1 See CAL. Govr CODE tit. 2, div. 1, ch. 7, §§ 8550, 8625, 8645, 8646(c) (West 2009).
56 Interview with Michael Bien, supra note 13.
17 Interview with Michael Bien, supra note 13; Interview with Ernie Galvan, supra note
13.
58 Motion to Convene a Three Judge Panel, Armstrong v. Davis, No. 94-cv-02307 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 15, 2006), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/publiclPC-CA-0001-
9000.pdf; Motion to Convene a Three Judge Panel, Plata v. Brown, No. 01-cv-01351 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 13, 2006), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-CA-0018-
9000.pdf; Motion to Convene a Three Judge Panel, Coleman v. Brown, No. 90-cv-00520 (E.D.
Cal. Nov. 13, 2006), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-CA-0002-
9000.pdf.
s9 Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion to Convene Three-Judge Court, Plata v. Schwarzeneg-
ger, No. 01-cv-01351 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2007), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/
chDocs/public/PC-CA-0057-0007.pdf; Order, Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. 90-cv-00520
(E.D. Cal. July 23, 2007), available at http://chadmin.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/not-public/
PC-CA-0002-0008.pdf.
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out prejudice to its later resubmission.60) This was apparently the very first
(and, so far, the only) population-order three-judge panel convened over
governmental objection since the PLRA's enactment.6'
The next move was up to the Ninth Circuit's then-Chief Judge, Mary
Schroeder. Three-judge district courts are usually staffed with the district
judge for the relevant underlying case, another district judge, and a court of
appeals judge, with the latter two chosen essentially at random. But this
matter had two underlying district court cases, and Chief Judge Schroeder
decided, accordingly, to put both Judge Henderson and Judge Karlton on the
three-judge court. The remaining slot was apparently assigned "on the
wheel" (that is, at random) to Judge Stephen Reinhardt,62 well known as one
of the most liberal members of the federal bench.63 Given the entire federal
judiciary from which to pick, it would have been hard to populate a court
more likely to be favorable to prisoner plaintiffs than the PlatalColeman
three-judge court. The State appealed to the Ninth Circuit to reverse the
district judges' orders convening the three-judge court, but those appeals
were soon dismissed as interlocutory."
After various motions and discovery, the three-judge court began to try
to move the matter towards settlement. In November 2007, the panel ap-
pointed retired California Court of Appeal Justice Elwood Lui as settlement
referee and current California Court of Appeal Justice Peter Siggins as a
consultant and advisor to the settlement referee.65 After six months of work,
Justices Lui and Siggins submitted a settlement proposal; it would have in-
cluded, if adopted, an immediate population goal of 158% of design capacity
(132,500), and three strategies for additional population reduction: local di-
' See Amended Minute Order, Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, No. 94-cv-02307 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 15, 2007), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-CA-0001-
0022.pdf.
6' For information on all the post-PLRA population orders of which I am aware, see http://
bit.ly/postPLRAjail, and http://bit.ly/postPLRAprison.
62 See Order Designating United States District Court Composed of Three Judges Pursuant
to Section 2284, Title 28 United States Code, Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. 90-cv-00520,
No. 01-cv-01351 (E.D. Cal., N.D. Cal. July 26, 2007), available at http://www.clearinghouse.
net/chDocs/public/PC-CA-0057-0008.pdf.
63 See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, 9th Circuit Judge Reinhardt Unfazed by Supreme Court
Criticism, ABA JOURNAL (July 19, 2011), http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/9th-circuit
judge reinhardt unfazed-by-supreme-courtcriticism/ ("viewed as possibly the country's
most liberal jurist").
* Order at 1, Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. 90-cv-00529, No. 01-cv-01351 (9th Cir.
Sept. 11, 2007), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-CA-0057-0014.
pdf.
65 See Order Appointing Settlement Referee and Consultant, Coleman v. Schwarzenegger,
No. 90-cv-00529, No. 01-cv-01351 (E.D. Cal., N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2007), available at http://
www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/publiclPC-CA-0057-0047.pdf. For a biography of Justice Sig-
gins, see Peter J. Siggins, CALIFORNIA COURTS, http://www.courts.ca.gov/7660.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 26, 2012). For information on former Justice Lui, see California Appellate Court
Legacy Project - Video Interview Transcript: Justice Elwood Lui (2007), available at http://
www.courts.ca.gov/documents/ElwoodLui_6132.pdf. Justice Lui was the managing partner
of the law firm Jones Day, which had been a part of the plaintiffs' counsel team. Justice
Siggins had previously been the lead lawyer for the State's defense of correctional law cases.
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version for short-term sentenced convicts and those facing probation revoca-
tion; alternative sanctions for lower-level parole violators; and an
augmentation of good-time credits to include programming credits.66 The
final population goal was to be subject to development by an advisory body,
but if set lower than 129,850 or greater than 135,150, the State and the plain-
tiffs, respectively, were to be allowed to withdraw from the settlement. It
seems that both the State and the plaintiffs were prepared to sign on to some-
thing close to this proposal, but that other, intervening parties - most pub-
licly, the Republican legislators - objected.67
Even though the settlement discussions failed, participants attribute to
them a vital role in the eventual population planning. There were dozens of
participants, divided into four working groups that met at great length and
repeatedly over months.68 Plaintiffs' counsel Ernie Galvan calls the negotia-
tions "kind of a dress rehearsal" for the eventual framing and passage of
Assembly Bill 109, the state statute that eventually enacted realignment. He
explains that in the settlement negotiations, "everyone got a chance to vent,
and to get their dealbreakers out on the table"; without these discussions, he
says, one constituency or another would later have killed realignment. Cor-
rections Secretary Matt Cate agrees that the settlement negotiations were
important because they "got policymakers from many different stakeholder
groups, including law enforcement, to begin thinking about evidence-based
solutions to large correctional and public safety problems." 9 The settlement
negotiations, Cate says, provided "the urgency necessary for law enforce-
ment groups to begin thinking about safe ways to reduce incarceration."
(Cate emphasizes, however, that realignment discussions, which started "in
the Governor-Elect's offices in late 2010," were themselves wide-ranging,
intensive, and time-consuming.)
In fact, it is worth pausing to think about this episode a bit more analyt-
ically. Notwithstanding the romanticism of rights and the preeminence in
ordinary discourse of judges and their lawgiving function, litigation is, first
and foremost, an occasion for negotiation. Mark Galanter has cleverly cap-
tured this truth with the neologism "litigotiation" - "the strategic pursuit
of a settlement through mobilizing the court process."70 Ordinarily, litiga-
tion gives extra negotiation points to the plaintiff; otherwise, why bother
' Status Report and Draft Proposal by Settlement Referee at 7-9, Coleman v.
Schwarzenegger, No. 90-cv-00529, No. Ol-cv-01351 (E.D. Cal., N.D. Cal. May 27, 2008),
available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-CA-0057-0024.pdf.
67 See LEGISLATOR INTERVENORS' POSITION STATEMENT RE: DRAFr SETTLEMENT REFEREE
PROPOSAL (June 2, 2009), available at http://cssrc.us/pubs/080626_LegIntervenors_State
ment.pdf.
68 Interview with Ernie Galvan, supra note 13.
69 Interview with Matthew Cate, supra note 13.
70 Marc Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach About Legal Process, 34 J.
LEGAL EDUc. 268, 268 (1984). See also Ralph Cavanagh & Austin Sarat, Thinking About
Courts: Toward and Beyond a Jurisprudence of Judicial Competence, 14 LAW & Soc'k REV.
371, 405 (1980) ("Extended impact litigation does not displace negotiation and compromise
but is frequently an essential precondition to it.").
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bringing the case? (Unless, that is, litigation is used as a publicity/organiz-
ing tool.") In institutional reform cases, the distance between the plaintiff
class and class counsel can mean that it is the advocates serving as the cases'
lawyers who gain what bargaining chips there are to be gained.72 Plaintiffs
and/or their counsel increase their agenda-setting influence; 73 they gain the
ability to receive information and to have their questions answered and their
arguments taken seriously; they augment their capacity to make news and
garner publicity. And of course, depending on the law and the judge, they
may gain access to additional threats of bad consequences if they are not
satisfied. All this was important and influential in Plata and Coleman. But
what is more unusual, because it stemmed from the PLRA's wide-open inter-
vention rules, was the way that settlement discussions created an extraordi-
narily open and explicit negotiation among the many different stakeholders.
Added to the State and the prisoners' counsel was not just the correctional
officers' union (tremendously influential in California7 4), but also the district
attorneys, Republican legislators, sheriffs and police chiefs, probation of-
ficers, and counties." All of these groups have influence in state politics -
but legislative negotiations are rarely as time-consuming, as open (with re-
spect to participants), or as structured (with respect to process) as the settle-
ment negotiations in Plata/Coleman. And given that it is always easier to
kill a bill than to pass one, it may be that only this kind of search for buy-in
could have laid the groundwork for the eventual realignment plan.
In any event, settlement efforts failed and the matter proceeded to trial
on November 18, 2008.76 The transcript reflects a sharp focus on the public
safety aspects of the case, in response to the PLRA's command that courts
"give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the opera-
tion of a criminal justice system caused by the relief."" The plaintiffs' case
was built with expert testimony that focused on risk classification - evi-
dence that many of those released from prison posed low recidivism and
public safety threats - and on the criminogenic influence of short-term
prison stays for technical parole violators who cycled in and out of Califor-
nia's prisons. Plaintiffs' counsel Michael Bien explains that for him, as for
" See, e.g., Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REv. 941, 955
(2011).
7 I explore the role of plaintiffs' lawyers in prison and jail litigation in depth in Schlanger,
Beyond the Hero Judge, supra note 17, at 2015-30.
7 On agenda setting, see generally JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND
PULIC POLICIES (2d ed. 1995); Mark Kessler, Legal Mobilization for Social Reform: Power
and the Politics of Agenda Setting, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 121 (1990).
74 
See, e.g., JOSHUA PAGE, THE TOUGHEST BEAT: POLITICS, PUNISHMENT, AND THE PRISON
OFFICERS UNION IN CAUFORNIA 44-80 (2011).
" Interview with Michael Bien, supra note 13; Interview with Ernie Galvan, supra note
13.
7'6 Minute Entry at 4, Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. 90-cv-00529, No. 01-cv-01351
(E.D. Cal., N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2009), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/
PC-CA-0057-0029.pdf.
n 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2006).
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most prisoners' rights advocates, public safety had not previously been an
explicit part of constitutional-conditions cases. "We were forced by the
PLRA to focus on public safety, and that was a blessing," he told me. "It
makes us far more effective as advocates out of court, if we can say that
crowding is hurting public safety rather than just violating the rights of
prisoners.""
On February 9, 2009, the three-judge court issued a "tentative ruling,"
informing the parties that it was inclined to hold that all the prerequisites for
a population order had been satisfied, and to issue such an order: "Although
the evidence may be less than perfectly clear, it appears to the Court that in
order to alleviate the constitutional violations California's inmate population
must be reduced to at most 120% to 145% of design capacity, with some
institutions or clinical programs at or below 100%."7 The court opined fur-
ther that California could, if it chose, achieve this kind of population reduc-
tion without an adverse effect on public safety.s0 The court emphasized that
that numerous private and public stakeholders - the CDCR's "Expert Panel
on Adult Offender Recidivism Reduction Programming," the governor, the
legislature - had proposed or supported reform measures involving changes
to earned credits and parole that would decrease prison population by tens of
thousands of state prisoners. "We cannot believe that such support would
exist if the adoption of such measures would adversely affect public safety.
We thus infer from the universal official support for these measures that they
are not likely to result in adverse public safety consequences."" Rather than
issuing a population order, however, the court invited the parties to restart
settlement negotiations, perhaps facilitated by the same settlement referees
as before.82
The State, however, declined to negotiate further,83 and on August 4,
2009, the three-judge court finally answered the multi-billion-dollar question
- What was the population goal going to be? - in its ruling for the plain-
tiffs. After 182 exhaustive pages of findings of fact and conclusions of law,
7 Interview with Michael Bien, supra note 13.
7 Tentative Ruling at 4, Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. 90-cv-00529, No. 01-cv-01351
(E.D. Cal., N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2009), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/
PC-CA-0057-0029.pdf.
8o Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2006).
8 Tentative Ruling at 4, Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. 90-cv-00529, No. 01-cv-01351
(E.D. Cal., N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2009), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/
PC-CA-0057-0029.pdf, referring to CAL. DEPT OF CORR. AND REHAB., EXPERT PANEL ON
ADULT OFFENDER AND RECIDIVISM REDUCTION PROGRAMMING, REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA
STATE LEGISLATURE: A ROADMAP FOR EFFECTIVE OFFENDER PROGRAMMING IN CALIFORNIA 93
(June 29, 2009), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/news/PressReleaseArchive/2007_Press
Releases/docs/ExpertPanelRpt.pdf.
82 Tentative Ruling at 4, Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. 90-cv-00529, No. 01-cv-01351
(E.D. Cal., N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2009), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/
PC-CA-0057-0029.pdf.
83 Defendants' Response to Tentative Ruling at 2, Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. 90-cv-
00529, No. 01-cv-01351 (E.D. Cal., N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2009), available at http://www.clearing
house.net/chDocs/public/PC-CA-0002-0036.pdf.
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the court instructed the State to present a plan within forty-five days "that
will in no more than two years reduce the population of the [California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation's] adult institutions to 137.5%
of their combined design capacity."8 After the three-judge court denied a
motion to stay that order, 5 California submitted a population plan that pro-
vided, instead, for a reduction of population to 166% of design capacity.
The three-judge court promptly rejected this attempt, scolding the State but
declining to impose sanctions." The State's population reduction plan fi-
nally followed on November 12. The State referenced numerous ideas for
reducing prison population, ranging from improvement in probation supervi-
sion that would decrease probation revocation to diversion programs and
nonincarcerative sanctions, to out-of-state contracts - but the document did
not commit to any of the proposals.8 1
Rather than adopting any of the ideas in a court order, on January 10,
2010, the court simply ordered the State to reach a shrinking set of popula-
tion benchmarks:
* 167% of design capacity within six months of the order's effective
date
* 155% within twelve months
* 147% within eighteen months
* 137.5% within twenty-four months88
Michael Bien, lead class counsel in Coleman, recalls that to get an order that
would survive on appeal, he felt that during his closing argument he "had to
convince the three-judge court not to issue what they thought was a strong
and appropriate order. I got up there to argue that the political leaders had to
make the decisions." 9 In the end, the three-judge court agreed, and indeed
went to extraordinary lengths to avoid dictating to the State how it should
implement the population order. Presumably this was in part because of the
Supreme Court's rather vehement insistence (in a prior prison case from the
Ninth Circuit, no less) that states must be given a first chance to propose a
remedy in institutional reform litigation against them, both because they are
' Opinion and Order at 183, Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. 90-cv-00529, No. 01-cv-
01351 (E.D. Cal., N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/
publicfPC-CA-0002-003 I.pdf.
85 Order Denying Motion to Stay August 4, 2009 Order at 3, Coleman v. Schwarzenegger,
No. 90-cv-00529, No. 01-cv-01351 (E.D. Cal., N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009), available at http://
www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-CA-0057-0052.pdf.
86 Order Rejecting Defendants' Population Reeducation Plan and Directing the Submission
of a Plan that Complies with the August 4, 2009 Opinion and Order at 2, Coleman v.
Schwarzenegger, No. 90-cv-00529, No. 01-cv-01351 (E.D. Cal., N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2009),
available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/publiclPC-CA-0002-0038.pdf.
87 Defendants' Response to Three-Judge Court's October 21, 2009 Order at 2, Coleman v.
Schwarzenegger, No. 90-cv-00529, No. 01-cv-01351 (E.D. Cal., N.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2009),
available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/publiclPC-CA-0002-0037.pdf.
18 Order to Reduce Prison Population at 4, Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. 90-cv-00529,
No. 01-cv-01351 (E.D. Cal., N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2010), available at http://www.clearinghouse.
net/chDocs/public/PC-CA-0057-0035.pdf.
9 Interview with Michael Bien, supra note 13.
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more expert than either the court or the plaintiffs, and because they are dem-
ocratically accountable." The PLRA's requirement that ordered relief be
"the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation" also counsels
strongly in favor of leaving states free to declare their own remedies, where
possible. In addition, it is hard to imagine the Supreme Court upholding an
order whose details the Justices could pick apart and second-guess, rather
than one with only two crucial terms (137.5% of rated capacity in two
years). And finally, the judges must have wanted an approach that the State
and counties could live with; one that the governor could defend and advo-
cate in the legislature; one that might, accordingly, work. As Judge Hender-
son describes his thinking, "It's clear to me - although I can't speak for
Judges Karlton and Reinhardt - that realignment is a political deal, in
which the Governor went to the fifty-eight counties and got something that
every county could live with."9'
B. In the Supreme Court
Simultaneously to issuing the ruling, the three-judge court stayed its
own order pending Supreme Court review. 92 This delay did not entirely halt
progress in the case, however. For one thing, nonpopulation matters contin-
ued apace in both Plata and Coleman.93 But even with respect to the popula-
tion order, the parties seem not to have felt all that much suspense. Rather,
as in the district court (although with less certainty), they seem to have ex-
pected that the Supreme Court would affirm at least the imposition of a
population order, perhaps raising the goal somewhat. As in most recent
cases with sharp ideological stakes, Justice Kennedy was seen to be the
swing Justice - but in this area more than many others, he leans left. A
Californian to his core,94 and with significant ties to many of the Plata/Cole-
man participants," Justice Kennedy was well known to Plata and Coleman's
parties, and he has, over the years, taken a notably reformist tack in speeches
"See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 362 (1996) (reversing the Ninth Circuit and striking
down a court order in part because the state was not given the first chance to design a remedy).
91 Interview with Thelton Henderson, supra note 13.
92 Order to Reduce Prison Population at 6, Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. 90-cv-00529,
No. 01-cv-01351 (E.D. Cal., N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2010), available at http://www.clearinghouse.
net/chDocs/public/PC-CA-00 I 8-0079.pdf.
93 Coleman v. Brown, No. 90-cv-00520 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 1990), available at http://
www.cleainghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-CA-0002-9000.pdf; Plata v. Brown, No. 01-cv-
1351 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2001), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/publiclPC-
CA-0018-9000.pdf.
9 A recent profile describes Justice Kennedy as "the epitome of 'a Sacramento person'
(quoting Joan Didion, who has known him since childhood) - committed to "ad hoc" "prob-
lem solving" by "individual power brokers who could find the middle ground." Massimo
Calabresi & David Von Drehle, What Will Justice Kennedy Do?, TIME, June 18, 2012, at 32.
* To cite just one example, Plata's receiver, Clark Kelso, was first Justice Kennedy's law
clerk on the Ninth Circuit, and then his colleague at the McGeorge School of Law. See Biog-
raphy of J. Clark Kelso, McGEORGE SCHOOL OF LAw, http://www.mcgeorge.edu/JClark
Kelso.htm?display=FullBio (last visited Oct. 12, 2012).
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on prison conditions. In a major address to the American Bar Association,
for example, Justice Kennedy called the American incarceration experiment
a failure: "Our resources are misspent, our punishments too severe, our
sentences too long."96 (State officials will not discuss their thinking on this
topic with me, but presumably they declined to settle, notwithstanding the
faintness of their hope for success in the Supreme Court, because they
sought the political cover of a court order.)
Oral argument in the Supreme Court, on November 30, 2010 - a mere
month after the election of Governor Jerry Brown - confirmed participants'
sense of the Court; Justice Kennedy several times telegraphed his inclination
to affirm, thus offering the State little prospect of an outright reversal. There
were, however, hints in the argument that the Court might revise the popula-
tion order to set a 145% goal and a timeframe of five years.97 In any event,
however, the Supreme Court's May 2011 five-to-four ruling affirmed the
three-judge court's population order in its entirety. In an opinion by, sure
enough, Justice Kennedy, the Court held: "The State's desire to avoid a pop-
ulation limit, justified as according respect to state authority, creates a cer-
tain and unacceptable risk of continuing violations of the rights of sick and
mentally ill prisoners, with the result that many more will die or needlessly
suffer. The Constitution does not permit this wrong."98 The Court empha-
sized that the order it affirmed might well never lead to the actual early
release of any prisoner, since it allows "the State to comply with the popula-
tion limit by transferring prisoners to county facilities or facilities in other
States, or by constructing new facilities to raise the prisons' design capacity.
And the three-judge court's order does not bar the State from undertaking
any other remedial efforts.""
Although it affirmed the three-judge district court in all respects, the
Court also emphasized that "[tihe three-judge court, however, retains the
authority, and the responsibility, to make further amendments to the existing
order or any modified decree it may enter as warranted by the exercise of its
sound discretion."'0 In fact, the Court manifested some skepticism toward
the order's two-year schedule ("The State may wish to move for modifica-
" See Justice Criticizes Lengthy Sentences, N.Y. TiHss, Aug. 10, 2003, http://www.ny-
times.com/2003/08/10/us/justice-criticizes-lengthy-sentences.html.
' See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 59, Schwarzenegger v. Plata, 130 S. Ct. 1140
(2011) (No. 09-1233), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oralarguments/argument
transcripts/09-1233.pdf (Justice Anthony Kennedy: "I think that certainly the Prison Litigation
Reform Act means that you have to, if you - if there is going to be a release order, it must be
releasing the minimum amount. . . . There was substantial expert opinion that 145 - 145
percent would be sufficient. Isn't - doesn't the evidence indicate to you that at least 145
ought to be the beginning point, not 137.5?"). Plata Receiver Clark Kelso confirms that after
the oral argument, "the only question was, would it be a straight affirmance, or would there be
a modification of either the time frame for compliance or the percentage figure." Interview
with Clark Kelso, supra note 13.
"8Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1941 (2011).
9 Id. at 1937.
1" Id. at 1946.
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tion of the three-judge court's order to extend the deadline for the required
reduction to five years from the entry of the judgment of this Court, the
deadline proposed in the State's first population reduction plan."101), and de-
voted considerable space to cautioning the three-judge court:
[T]he three-judge court must remain open to a showing or demon-
stration by either party that the injunction should be altered to en-
sure that the rights and interests of the parties are given all due and
necessary protection.
Proper respect for the State and for its governmental processes re-
quire that the three-judge court exercise its jurisdiction to accord
the State considerable latitude to find mechanisms and make plans
to correct the violations in a prompt and effective way consistent
with public safety. . . . [T]he three-judge court must give due
deference to informed opinions as to what public safety requires,
including the considered determinations of state officials regarding
the time in which a reduction in the prison population can be
achieved consistent with public safety. An extension of time may
allow the State to consider changing political, economic, and other
circumstances and to take advantage of opportunities for more ef-
fective remedies that arise as the Special Master, the Receiver, the
prison system, and the three-judge court itself evaluate the pro-
gress being made to correct unconstitutional conditions.102
However, Justice Kennedy wrote, these musings
are not intended to cast doubt on the validity of the basic premise
of the existing order. The medical and mental health care provided
by California's prisons falls below the standard of decency that
inheres in the Eighth Amendment. This extensive and ongoing
constitutional violation requires a remedy, and a remedy will not
be achieved without a reduction in overcrowding. The relief or-
dered by the three-judge court is required by the Constitution and
was authorized by Congress in the PLRA. The State shall imple-
ment the order without further delay. 0
The dissents were strident. Ignoring the flexible order actually on ap-
peal and characterizing the three-judge court's ruling as "an order requiring
California to release the staggering number of 46,000 convicted criminals,"
Justice Scalia (joined only by Justice Thomas) described it as "perhaps the
most radical injunction issued by a court in our Nation's history."'" A con-
trary outcome, he said, was "so clearly indicated by tradition and common
1o' Id. at 1947.
1
02 Id. at 1946.
10
3 Id. at 1947.
'1 Id. at 1950 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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sense" as to compel "every effort to read the law in such a way as to avoid
that outrageous result." 0 Moreover, he described the "proceedings that led
to this result" as "a judicial travesty." 06 Both Justice Scalia's dissent and a
separate one by Justice Alito (joined by Chief Justice Roberts) focused on
the issue of crime. 0 Justice Scalia argued that because the order's impact on
crime could not be evaluated through judicial factfinding, it constituted ille-
gitimate judicial policymaking. 0 Justice Alito, by contrast, disagreed not
with the idea of judicial factfinding about crime, but with the facts the three-
judge court found; he asserted that the order would increase crime by al-
lowing criminal offenders more time on the streets.109
The Supreme Court's opinion was dated May 23, 2011, but the judg-
ment was not formally transmitted to the three-judge district court until a
month later. So that court declared its now-ratified population order effec-
tive as of June 27, 2011 - giving California until the end of 2013 to reach a
population of 137.5% of design capacity." 0
C. After the Supreme Court: Realignment
California did not wait for the Supreme Court's May ruling to move
towards population reform. Policy discussions about how to address, simul-
taneously, California's deep deficit and the three-judge court order began in
the Governor-Elect's offices immediately after the November 2010 election.
In meeting after meeting, the Governor's staff, corrections officials, key leg-
islators, the district attorneys, the sheriffs, and the correctional officers'
union - all the stakeholders except for prisoners and their advocates -
worked through how to lower prison population, spend less money, and
avoid wholesale prisoner releases."' The result was a legislative proposal
introduced as part of a massive budget package just seven days after Gover-
nor Brown was swom in. The legislature began to consider Assembly Bill
109, entitled "Criminal justice alignment," on January 10, 2011.112 Gover-
nor Jerry Brown signed the bill into law in April 2011, six weeks before the
Supreme Court's opinion issued. A.B. 109 was drafted by the Governor's
staff and the Department of Corrections;" 3 it was kept out of legislative
committees and no floor amendments were made.' 14 The votes were nearly
105 Id.
0 Id. at 1951.
107 Id. at 1957; id. at 1959, 1965-68 (Alito, J., dissenting).
oI Id. at 1953 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
1" Id. at 1960-61 (Alito, J., dissenting).
"o Order Requiring Interim Reports at 2, Coleman v. Brown, No. 90-cv-00520, No. 01-
cv-01351 (E.D. Cal., N.D. Cal. June 30, 2011), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/
chDocs/public/PC-CA-0057-0059.pdf.
" Interview with Matthew Cate, supra note 13.
12The legislative history for A.B. 109 is available at http://legiscan.com/gaits/view/
223265.
" Interview with Matthew Cate, supra note 13.
14 Interview with Nick Warner, supra note 13.
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straight party line; the bill passed by a vote of 24 to 16 in the Senate, and 51
to 27 in the Assembly."'
Enacting Governor Brown's "realignment" vision, A.B. 109 (slightly
amended by A.B. 117, which was considered in June 2011, and signed just
three days after the three-judge court made the Plata/Coleman population
order effective"'6) addresses where prisoners serve their time; who is respon-
sible for supervising them in the community and deciding when to recommit
them for parole violations; and how much time parole violators are likely to
serve:
(1) The "non-non-nons": Realignment moves the imprisonment for
certain felons (those convicted of nonserious, nonviolent, and non-
sex crimes, usually called "non-non-nons," or "three-nons") to
county jails, rather than state prisons."' And now that the non-non-
nons are county prisoners, sheriffs have authority to release them if
necessary."'
(2) Community supervision: Realignment shifts primary responsibility
from the state to the counties for post-release supervision; counties
will now be responsible for monitoring non-non-non felons on pa-
role and supervised release,"' although the state remains responsi-
ble for other, more serious offenders. In addition, for both county
and state supervision, realignment has reduced from one year to six
months the period after which supervised persons are considered
for early discharge.120 And for state parolees under county supervi-
sion, it requires an end to supervision after one year (instead of
three years), if the person remains free of violations that result in a
custodial sanction.121
(3) Parole-revocation proceedings and terms: Beginning in 2013, re-
alignment sets parole-revocation proceedings to be handled by Su-
perior Court-affiliated hearing officers rather than the state Board
" For the roll call votes, see http://legiscan.com/gaits/view/223265. For party affiliations,
see http://senate.ca.gov/senators, http://assembly.ca.gov/assemblymembers.
116 See A.B. 117, California Legislature, 2011-2012 Regular Session (2011). See also
Order Requiring Interim Reports at 1, Coleman v. Brown, No. 90-cv-00529, No. 01-cv-01 351
(E.D. Cal., N.D. Cal. June 30, 2011), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/pub-
lic/PC-CA-0057-0059.pdf.
"' See A.B. 109 sec. 450, § 1 l70(h)(1), California Legislature, 2011-2012 Regular Ses-
sion (2011); A.B. 117 §§ 27-28 (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 (West 2010)).
"I See CAL. PENAL CODE § 4024.1 (West 2010) (allowing releases of jail prisoners up to
thirty days early under specified circumstances); S.B. 1023, California Legislature, 2011-2012
Regular Session (2011) (amending § 4024.1 to allow releases up to thirty days early, rather
than just five days); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.016 (West 2010) (allowing substitution of elec-
tronic monitoring for incarceration, where authorized by the Board of Supervisors).
Il9 Supplemental Brief for Defendant at 1, Brown v. Plata, No. 09-1233 (U.S. 2011) (cit-
ing A.B. 109 sec. 479, tit. 2.05, § 3451(a) (categories of felony offenders subject to commu-
nity supervision); see also id. at § 3451(b) (persons whom CDCR will still supervise)),
available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-CA-0057-0054.pdf.
120 CAL. PENAL CODE § 3001(a) (West 2010).
121 Id. § 3456.
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of Parole Hearings. And it requires parole-revocation sentences to
be served in county jails rather than in state prisons,'22 lessens the
recommitment period for parole revocation from one year to six
months, and allows prisoners serving a parole-revocation term to
earn credit for good conduct at a rate of 50% instead of 25%.123
Realignment started, it seems, with the observation that California's
jails had 10,000 empty beds, at the same time as the Plata/Coleman popula-
tion order declared that California's prisons had 30,000 excess prisoners.124
But crucially, realignment does not directly release anyone. As Medical
Care Receiver Clark Kelso explained, "politically, nobody could tolerate a
straight release of inmates prior to serving their sentence. But we needed to
reduce population by 20,000 to 30,000."l25 Instead of releasing prisoners
from state custody, realignment acts only on new admissions, slowing ad-
missions by altering parole terms, penalties, and good-time rules, and gradu-
ally shifting the non-non-non and felon parole-revocation population to
county jails. I discuss the impact on county jail populations, and the varied
coping strategies, in the subpart immediately following.
The counties - including sheriffs, district attorneys, and other politi-
cally powerful stakeholders - went along with this approach, albeit reluc-
tantly. As Orange County Sheriff Sandra Hutchens explains, "We had no
choice. The State had to deal with the three-judge panel and reduce popula-
tion. The sheriffs were given the option of working with the State on a plan,
or the State releasing tens of thousands of prisoners early, with no supervi-
sion." 26 Nonetheless, counties would never have agreed to this shift from
state to county responsibility without funding - over $1 billion annually of
state sales tax revenue, phased in over several years,127 added to acceleration
of $1.2 billion in jail construction bonding funding that had been authorized
in 2007.128 This is a lot of money, but to be clear, it is not enough to fund,
one-for-one, the entire cost of what will now be county prisoners. In fact,
for non-non-non prisoners sentenced to serve less than three years, the fund-
ing formula was based on an estimate of only six months of funding; for
122 A.B. 109 sec. 470, § 3000.09(e); A.B. 117 § 1 (codified at CAL. Govr CODE
§ 71622.5 (West 2011)), § 38 (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 3000.08 (West 2010)), § 44
(codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 3056 (West 2010)), § 50 (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 3455 (West 2011)). See also A.B. 117 § 38 (assigning all parole revocation, including for
those who are not "non-non-nons," to superior court (county) process, effective July 1, 2013).
123 A.B. 109 sec. 482, § 4019.
124 Interview with Matthew Cate, supra note 13.
125 Interview with Clark Kelso, supra note 13.
126 Interview with Sandra Hutchens, supra note 13.
127 A.B. 118 ch. 40, § 3, California Legislature, 2011-2012 Regular Session (2011) (codi-
fied at CAL. Gov'r CODE § 30025 et seq. (West 2011)).
" Public Safety and Offender Rehabilitation Services Act of 2007, A.B. 900, California
Legislature, 2007-2008 Regular Session (2007).
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longer-term non-non-non prisoners, the estimate was twenty months of
funding.12 9
Because realignment would not provide the counties with enough
money to fund their increased responsibilities, the deal needed a sweetener.
The crucial financial incentive was that the money came essentially with no
strings attached. Realignment money is a county block grant, allocated by a
formula that considered the number of offenders historically sent to state
prison, the county's adult population, and prior grant funding.130 Counties
can use the funding to increase jail capacity, to pay for alternatives to incar-
ceration, to expand drug addiction programs - whatever they work out with
their newly established Local Community Corrections Partnership Executive
Committee, which brings together each county's chief probation officer,
sheriff, district attorney, public defender, presiding judge, and a police chief
and social services department official.131 At the same time, of course,
county criminal justice leaders know that no promise made by the governor
can bind the legislature, and that no promise made by the legislature can
prevent a later change of plan. 3 2 As sheriffs' lobbyist Nick Warner points
out, "The major tenet of realignment is local flexibility." But that may al-
ready be slipping, he says: "Legislators are forgetting the deal. They are
doing what legislators do; they are trying to control."'
In addition, even if it stays string-free, the money itself is not, so far,
guaranteed. This is, even more than the prospect that the legislature will try
to dictate criminal justice policy, extremely anxiety-provoking for the coun-
ties; it recalls the devolution of responsibility for mental health services from
state to regional entities two decades earlier, which was inadequately funded
notwithstanding the state's early promises.13 4 Warner believes that "it's pos-
sible, as the economy is bottoming out, that we could engage in a massive
shift of population to the counties, with no or declining funds. That would
be the biggest early-release program ever - a complete disaster."' Gover-
nor Brown has succeeded in insulating the funding to some extent: over the
129 For extensive explanation of the funding formulas, see Dean Misczynski, Pun. POLICY
INST. OF CAL., RETHINKING THE STATE-LOCAL RELATIONSHIP. CORRECTIONS (2011), available
at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_81I DMR.pdf.
'"
0 See LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS OFFICE, THE 2012-13 BUDGET: THE 2011 REALIGNMENT OF
ADULT OFFENDERS - AN UPDATE 13 (Feb. 22, 2012), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/
Reports/docs/External-Reports/2011-realignment-of-adult-offenders-022212.pdf.
131 For analysis of the functioning of the committees, see Verma, supra note 20.
132 Interview with Bill Crout, supra note 13 ("The state has a long history of moving
problems from the state to the local level, funding for a short time, and then cutting the fund-
ing."); Interview with Nick Warner, supra note 13.
133 Interview with Nick Warner, supra note 13.
1
3 4 See generally J.R. Elpers, Public Mental Health Funding in California, 1959-1989, 40
HoSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 799 (1989); Mary Masland, The Political Development of
'Program Realignment': California's 1991 Mental Health Care Reform, 23 J. MENTAL
HEALTH ADMIN. 170 (1998); Verma, supra note 20 (drawing this comparison). For a discus-
sion of deinstitutionalization politics, see generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Past and Future
of Deinstitutionalization Litigation, 34 CARDOzo L. REv. 1 (2012).
133 Interview with Nick Warner, supra note 13.
2013] 187
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 48
objection of Republican legislators, realignment money was made a continu-
ous funding stream that a future legislature would have to vote affirmatively
to change (subject to gubernatorial veto), rather than a year-by-year funding
stream that future legislatures would have to vote to maintain.13 6 In addition,
the Governor agreed to sponsor a ballot initiative for November 2012 to
protect the funding from legislative erosion by enacting a state constitutional
amendment.13 7 He has done this, and coupled it with school funding in what
proved to be a successful effort to secure passage.'
Realignment's financial risk for the counties is not shared by the state;
from Sacramento's perspective, the budgetary impact is unambiguously posi-
tive - an enormous source of its appeal in the midst of California's severe
budget crisis. Even though realignment required a massive transfer of funds
from the state to the counties, that transfer amounts to substantially less
money than the state would itself have spent otherwise. Moreover, savings
were doubly helpful for the Governor's budget because of the interaction
with Proposition 98, which requires the state to spend a set portion of its
General Fund revenues on K-12 schooling; 19 realignment money never
makes it into the General Fund.140 And simultaneously, the political damage
inherent in reducing prison population was minimized by the argument that
prisoners were neither being released, nor having their sentences shortened
(by much); they were merely being moved. Even so, realignment depended
for passage on a crucial change to California budget politics, approved by
voters in the same election that voted in Governor Brown: Proposition 25
made it possible for a bare majority to pass a budget in the state legislature,
where previously a two-thirds vote had been required.14 1 Only one Republi-
can voted for realignment in either the California Assembly or Senate; a
two-thirds requirement would have killed the deal.142
Realignment ended up with an effective start date of October 1, 2011,143
so although some population reduction based on earlier reforms had already
'36 See A.B. 111, California Legislature, 2011-2012 Regular Session (2011); A.B. 94,
California Legislature, 2011-2012 Regular Session (2011); A.B. 118, California Legislature,
2011-2012 Regular Session (2011); S.B. 89, California Legislature, 2011-2012 Regular Ses-
sion (2011); S.B. 87, California Legislature, 2011-2012 Regular Session (2011). For the
state's summary of funding enactments, see Funding of Realignment, CAL. DEPr OF CORR.
AND REHAB., available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/Funding-Realignment.html.
' See Letter from Governor Jerry Brown to Members of the Cal. State Assembly Corr. &
Rehab., available at http://gov.ca.gov/docs/AB_109_Signing.Message.pdf.
'38 Schools and Local Public Safety Act, A.B. 18A, California Legislature, 2011-2012
Regular Session (2011); Text of Proposed Laws, CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.
gov/2012/general/pdf/text-proposed-laws-v2.pdf#nameddest=prop3O. Proposition 30 was ap-
proved on November 6, 2012.
1
3 9 
Ron MANWARING, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, PROPOSITION 98 PRIMER (2005),
available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/2005/prop-98_primer/prop_98_primer_020805.htm.
'40 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 6051.15, 6201.15 (West 2011).
141 Secretary Matt Cate and his legislative affairs aide, Aaron Maguire, made this point to
me in a telephone interview. Interview with Matthew Cate, supra note 13.
142 See sources cited supra note 115.
143 See A.B. 116 § 3(h)(6), California Legislature, 2011-2012 Regular Session (2011).
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occurred by the time of the Supreme Court opinion, the sharper reductions
ushered in by realignment occurred later. See Figure 1.
FIGURE 1: CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL JUSTICE POPULATIONS, 2000-2012
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Source: CDCR & Cal. Bd. of State and Cmty. Corr.; see Technical Appendix, infra note 176.
By order of the three-judge court, California began reporting monthly
on its progress towards the two-year 137.5% goal, as well as the interim six-
month goals. The state reached the first six-month goal (167% of design
capacity) on time, and reached the one-year goal (155% of design capacity)
two months early. Population is on track to meet December 2012's bench-
mark (147% of capacity). But the state is resisting the requirement that it
reduce population to meet subsequent deadlines. CDCR's public population
projections are that in June 2013, two years after the population order's start,
prison population would be at 141%, not 137.5%, of design capacity -
about 3,000 prisoners over, if the currently out-of-state prisoners are brought
back to California, a move that would save considerable money.144 In May
2012, California filed a brief that explained that if those projections held, it
planned to request modification of the population order to increase the final
goal to 145% of design capacity; defendants promised to support that request
by "demonstrating that they can provide a constitutional level of care at a
144 See CDCR, BLUEPRINT, supra note 7, at 6; see also Order Requiring Interim Reports at
2, Coleman v. Brown, No. 90-cv-00529, No. 01-cv-01351 (E.D. Cal., N.D. Cal. June 30,
2011), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/publiclPC-CA-0057-0059.pdf.
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higher population density."l 45 Plaintiffs' counsel, predictably enough, ob-
jected vehemently. 146 The three-judge court's response has remained mea-
sured but quite firm: on September 7, 2012, the court noted that it was "not
inclined to entertain a motion to modify the 137.5% population cap based on
the factual circumstances identified by defendants," but that it was more
favorably disposed towards a potential motion for a six-month extension. It
instructed the State to file papers identifying methods for compliance, 147 and
in response to those papers, is now requiring the State to develop a popula-
tion reduction plan by January 2013.148
As for medical and mental health care in prison, some aspects of care
are certainly improving. In May, the receiver's report noted a number of
ongoing problems and challenges, but summarized:
It is clear that we have made significant progress towards full im-
plementation of the Turnaround Plan of Action and towards our
ultimate goal of providing a constitutionally adequate level of
medical care within California's adult prisons. . . . [T]he scores
reported by the OIG [California Office of the Inspector General]
[are] showing consistent improvement, the number of clearly
avoidable deaths [is] remaining at a consistently low rate, and ...
progress [is] being made by the State in reducing overcrowding.149
Judge Henderson responded by pivoting the case towards its next
phase, in which the receivership will be phased out, facility by facility.5 0
The most recent Coleman special master's report is less positive, but it too
145 Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for an Order Requiring Defend-
ants to Demonstrate How They Will Achieve the Required Population Reduction by June 2013
at 2, Coleman v. Brown, No. 90-cv-00529, No. 01-cv-01351 (E.D. Cal., N.D. Cal. May 23,
2012), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-CA-0057-0045.pdf; see
also Defendants' Response to June 7, 2012 Order Requiring Further Briefing at 1, Coleman v.
Brown, No. 90-cv-00529, No. 01-cv-01351 (E.D. Cal., N.D. Cal. June 22, 2012), available at
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-CA-0057-0080.pdf.
14 Plaintiffs' Application for Limited Discovery and Order to Show Cause Re Contempt
at 1, Coleman v. Brown, No. 90-cv-00529, No. 01-cv-01351 (E.D. Cal., N.D. Cal. Aug. 22,
2012), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/publiclPC-CA-0057-0094.pdf.
147 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs' May 9 and August 22, 2012
Motions at 3-4, Coleman v. Brown, No. 90-cv-00529, No. 01-cv-01351 (E.D. Cal., N.D. Cal.
Sept. 7, 2012), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-CA-0057-0093.
pdf.
148 Order to Develop Plans to Achieve Required Prison Population Reduction at 1, Cole-
man v. Brown, No. 90-cv-00529, No. 01-cv-01351 (E.D. Cal., N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2012), avail-
able at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-CA-0057-0072.pdf.
149 Achieving a Constitutional Level of Medical Care in California's Prisons: Twentieth
Tri-Annual Report of the Federal Receiver's Turnaround Plan of Action, for January 1 - April
30, 2012 at 26, Plata v. Brown, No. 01-cv-01351 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2012), available at http://
www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-CA-0018-0094.pdf.
Iso See Order Proposing Receivership Transition Plan at 1, Plata v. Brown, No. 01-cv-
01351 (N.D. Cal. May 30, 2012), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/
PC-CA-0018-0084.pdf; Order Re: Receivership Transition Plan and Expert Evaluations at 6-8,
Plata v. Brown, No. 01-cv-01351 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2012), available at http://www.clearing-
house.net/chDocs/publiclPC-CA-0018-0098.pdf.
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notes a number of areas of improvement."' Plaintiffs' counsel continue to
see serious medical and mental health care deficiencies, but they agree that
real improvements have occurred.15 2
D. Realignment in the Counties
Moving prisoners from state to county custody, as realignment does,
has two key features. First, it shifts population from the court-scrutinized
state system to the less crowded and less scrutinized counties. But much
more important - and even apart from the necessarily population-reducing
parole changes' - such a move has the potential to be decarcerative be-
cause it shifts prisoners from low-discretion state custody to high-discretion
county custody. It is because of that discretion that California counties vary
so extremely in their incarceration rates, even after controlling for popula-
tion and crime rates.15 4 As The Economist explained recently:
Sheriffs can, for example, send troublemakers to mental-health
treatment instead of jail. They can "flash-incarcerate" people for
just a few hours. They can put them under home surveillance with
a GPS monitor strapped to their ankle, or make them do commu-
nity service and drug rehabilitation. They can refer them to voca-
tional training so they can get jobs."'
Realignment combines three ideas: to use the county beds that were empty
prior to realignment; to expand incarcerative capacity to some extent; and to
reduce incarceration by using various alternative pretrial reporting and sen-
tencing methods - day-reporting centers, home detention with GPS moni-
toring, intensive probation, and the like. The decarceration methods can be
used for the non-non-nons, or, more likely, for other county prisoners. But
however the methods are implemented, realignment was intended to induce,
though not to require, an ambitious and incarceration-reducing set of
"5I Twenty-Fourth Round Monitoring Report of the Special Master on the Defendants'
Compliance with Provisionally Approved Plans, Policies, and Protocols at 9-11, Coleman v.
Brown, No. 90-cv-00520 (E.D. Cal. July 2, 2012), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/
chDocs/public/PC-CA-0002-0036.pdf.
152 Interview with Michael Bien, supra note 13; Interview with Don Specter, supra note
13.
153 Recall, under realignment, parole supervision for non-non-non offenders released from
prison is shortened: although the basic supervision term for most offenders is still set at three
years, the new law encourages discharge from supervision after six months free of custody,
and mandates discharge after one year free of custody. The point is that fewer violations will
occur in this shortened time. And the custody term for parole violation has moved from
twelve months with the potential for a one-quarter reduction based on good conduct, to six
months with the potential for a one-half reduction; that, too, will produce fewer prisoners in
custody on any given day. A.B. 109 § 482, California Legislature, 2011-2012 Regular Ses-
sion (2011).
154 See generally Ball, supra note 19.
155 California's Overcrowded Prisons: The Challenges of "Realignment," THE EcoNo-
MIsT, May 19, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21555611.
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changes. In this Part, I discuss potential effects, and what seems actually to
be happening.
Logically, counties have three possible responses to the realignment
wave of prisoners who would have otherwise entered state custody. They
can, alone or in combination, expand capacity, limit admissions or
sentences, or release prisoners:
Expansion: Counties could, theoretically, absorb at least some of the
influx of new prisoners and, if they wish, avoid decarceration by building
new jails or wings of jails, buying no-longer-needed state facilities, or some
similar strategy. And in fact, the state has approved applications by twenty-
one counties to use A.B. 900 money to build over 10,000 new jail beds - a
total of $1.2 billion in jail capacity expansion.'-" In addition, the state has
another $500 million jail construction program in the works, which may
fund added capacity or treatment space.' In addition, a recent ACLU anal-
ysis of county realignment plans tallies that the counties are reporting their
intent to use realignment funds to expand capacity by as much as another
7,000 beds.'15
If all of this building actually occurs, it would total over 17,000 new jail
beds - a huge portion of the prison population reduction required by the
Plata/Coleman population order. But it seems unlikely that all the building
will, in fact, occur. Non-A.B. 900 building relies on money the counties can
otherwise spend on other priorities, which means that even plans already
announced are tentative - and that the building is unlikely to happen unless
prompted by significant crowding. A.B. 900 building is, however, a differ-
ent story, because it uses 90% state money. ' In Orange County, for exam-
ple, the sheriff plans to build over 500 beds using $100 million in A.B. 900
bond funds,'60 even though it could easily solve any shortage of jail beds by
refusing to house federal immigrant detainees.''
Limiting admissions and sentences: At the same time, some of the
counties are simultaneously or instead looking at nonbuilding options: ex-
pansions of pretrial classification, bail reform, electronic monitoring, drug
rehabilitation and reentry assistance for prisoners to reduce recidivism, work
'6 See generally A.B. 900, California Legislature, 2007-2008 Regular Session (2008)
(setting up jail capacity funding); Interview with Bob Takeshta, supra note 13.
15' See S.B. 1022, California Legislature, 2011-2012 Regular Session (2012), codified at
2012 Cal. Stat. ch. 42; Interview with Bob Takeshta, supra note 13.
1" ACLU OF CAL., PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT: CALIFORNIA AT A CROSSROADS 15
(2012), available at https://www.aclunc.org/docs/criminal-justice/public-safety-realignment
california at a_crossroads.pdf.
'" A.B. 900 § 2. The match rate was subsequently reduced to ten percent by A.B. 94 § 3,
California Legislature, 2011-2012 Regular Session (2011) (amending CAL. Gov'T CODE
§ 15820.917 (West 2011)).
16 Sean Emery, O.C. Sheriff Gets Funds for Major Musick Jail Expansion, ORANGE
CouNTY REG., Mar. 8, 2012, at Bl.
161 Interview with Sandra Hutchens, supra note 13. Orange County voluntarily houses
about 700 federal immigrant detainees, and gets about thirty million dollars in exchange.
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furlough, and day-reporting centers.'62 Many California counties have obvi-
ous types of overincarceration; in an interview in July, Corrections Secretary
Matt Cate pointed out, for example, that in some counties, pretrial detainees
constituted three-quarters or more of jail population' 3 - this was compared
to a state average, in 2011, of 70%16 and a national average of 60%,161 itself
up almost ten percentage points from the national average two decades
ago.166 If the number of sentenced prisoners were held constant, decreasing
California's statewide pretrial incarceration so that it amounts to 60% of jail
population, as it did in 2000 and still does nationwide, could alone cause a
population reduction of nearly 18,000 county prisoners.'67 Cate suggests that
"evidence-based criminal justice practices came to California just in time,"
because counties can use objective classification and risk assessment instru-
ments that "have been reviewed and have real data behind them" to decide
whom not to admit and whom to release (more on such releases immediately
below). The result, he argues, is that jail population reduction can take place
while minimizing any public safety downside.'68 Plata's Judge Henderson,
too, reports that he had no interest in "dumping the state's problems onto the
counties." He continues, "That's why I was hopeful that this would force
the counties to reexamine who they are keeping in their jails; force them to
examine their halfway houses and work furloughs. I'm hoping still that may
be the end effect here." 69
Prisoner releases: Thus far, the story I am telling is evident from the
legislative findings and language, and from CDCR and state reports. An
additional feature of the ecosystem is not a secret, but it has not been pub-
licly discussed to nearly the same extent. The hope that realignment will be
decarcerative relies not just on county discretion, but on court-enforceable
162 Id.; see also Interview with Gary Wion, supra note 13; Kurtis Alexander, Fresno
County Takes Cheaper Step of Criminal Rehab, FRESNO BEE, June 26, 2012 (describing com-
mitment by Fresno's Community Corrections Partnership of $848,000 for residential drug
treatment); Interview with Nick Warner, supra note 13.
'6 Interview with Matthew Cate, supra note 13. At the end of 2011, California's jail
survey listed eighteen jails in which pretrial prisoners constituted 75% or more of all prisoners.
See FACILITIES STANDARDS & OPERATIONS Div., CORR. STANDARDS AuTH., JAIL PROFILE SUR-
VEY, 4TH QUARTER 5 (2011), available at http://www.bscc.ca.gov/download.php?f=/2011_4th
qtr JPS-full-report.pdf.
* See FACILITIES STANDARDS & OPERATIONS Div., supra note 163, at 5.
6 See TODD D. MINTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR
2011 - STATISTICAL TABLES 7 tbl.9 (2012), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/
pdf/jim1 1st.pdf.
'6 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, BULLETIN: PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR
2000 9 (2001), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pjim00.pdf.
167 In fact, what has happened so far in 2012 is that the number of pretrial detainees has
decreased by less than 2,000 people, while the number of sentenced prisoners has increased by
nearly 9,000 people. So the current proportion of jail population that is pretrial is down to
62%; jail population overall is up. See FACILITIES STANDARDS & OPERATIONS Div., CORR.
STANDARDS AUTH., JAIL PROFILE SURVEY, 2ND QUARTER 4 (2012), available at http://www.
bscc.ca.gov/download.php?f=/2012_2ndQtrJPS-full-report.pdf.
161 Interview with Matthew Cate, supra note 13.
169 Interview with Thelton Henderson, supra note 13.
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population caps. Currently covering over a third of California's jails and jail
population, these orders have for two decades led each month to thousands
of prisoner releases when jail population runs up against the caps. (Of
course, county releases need not affect the actual prisoners shifted to the
counties under realignment; counties can pick whom to release, and are
likely to pick misdemeanants rather than felons, and pretrial prisoners rather
than convicts.) I discuss the history and functioning of population orders,
both generally and in California specifically, in depth in Section III.A, be-
low. For current purposes, it suffices to quote Clark Kelso again: "To some
extent, the state is taking advantage of the fact that the jails have federally
imposed caps. They already know how to figure out who gets released, and
who doesn't. The sheriffs already know how to take the political heat."7 0
There is deep dissensus among observers about the prospects for non-
incarcerative county responses to realignment. Some, like Barry Krisberg,
describe the plan of evidence-based sentencing reform at the county level as
a "liberal fantasy." His pessimistic conclusion is that reform is impossible:
"The progressives are saying, if we do pretrial reform, we could free up
space," but the sheriffs and other county officials "don't really have any
interest in fundamentally reforming." 7' But sheriffs' lobbyist Nick Warner
says that while change is "painful as hell," it is nonetheless occurring. He
describes the goal as "taking the lower-level inmates and programming
them" instead of putting them in jail. The result, he says, "is a crisis for
sure - and a huge opportunity. It's forcing change, which is scary but re-
ally exciting." The results are very diverse, he reports; in some counties,
there are "a lot of good things going on." In others, "we'll have over-
crowded local jails, and people will sue the pants off us."'72
Of course, some who believe that the results of realignment will, in-
deed, be decarcerative find that deeply problematic. Kimberly Hall Barlow,
who represented the sheriffs and other law enforcement intervenors in the
three-judge court trial, thinks that realignment will depress jail admissions
and increase jail releases, and that the result will be insufficient punishment
and insufficient deterrence. She points out another admissions mechanism:
Because "courts are aware that space is limited, they will sentence people to
probation instead of custody. . . . That's especially true for more complex
populations; women, drug addicts, the mentally ill."' 73 California's newspa-
pers are full of speculation that realignment will in turn increase crime.17 4
Others speculate that prosecutors and judges will respond in the opposite
170 Interview with Clark Kelso, supra note 13.
"' Interview with Barry Krisberg, supra note 13.
172 Interview with Nick Warner, supra note 13.
' Interview with Kimberly Hall Barlow, supra note 13.
174 See, e.g., Gillian Flaccus, Calif Inmate Switch Puts Pressure on County Jails, Associ-
ATED PRESS, May 19, 2012, available at http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Calif-inmate-
switch-puts-pressure-on-county-jails-35 70813.php.
[Vol. 48194
Plata v. Brown and Realignment
way, ratcheting up charges and sentences in order to assure state rather than
county custody for particular offenders." 5
It is too soon to say who is right factually about even the trends in
population, much less in crime. Jail population is up, but much less than the
concomitant decrease in prison population. From October 1, 2011 to Octo-
ber 1, 2012, California's prison population was down over 23,000; over the
same period of time, jail population was up, but only by 6,000.176
It may be foolhardy to attempt with so few post-realignment datapoints
to discern trends, but at least the preliminary indications suggest several pos-
sible changes to look for:
* Decline in several components of jail population:
o misdemeanants
" state-contracted prisoners
" prisoners awaiting CDCR transport
* Increase in average length of stay
* Decline in bookings
All but the final item on the list are predictable given realignment's terms.
As jails get an increased influx of felony prisoners, both non-non-nons and
parole violators, one would expect sheriffs to prioritize bonding out, alterna-
tively supervising, or otherwise releasing the relatively low-priority misde-
meanor prisoners, whether they are awaiting trial or serving sentences. The
remaining prisoners would then presumably stay somewhat longer than
those they are replacing. And as the state experiences less prison crowding,
one would expect CDCR to house its own prisoners77 rather than paying
jails to hold them, and to pick up more speedily sentenced prisoners doing
state time (whose care in county custody they are also otherwise required to
pay for, after several days).17 1
The decline in bookings that took place in the final quarter of 2011,
noted in the final bullet, was very sharp - a greater than 10% decrease from
prior quarters, which were themselves down substantially from prior
years.179 The cause is not obvious to me, and some part of the decline was
reversed in subsequent quarters. Guesses about causes from those I have
asked vary. (Could it be declining crime rates? Budget cuts to the courts,
1 This point was made to me by Mona Lynch. See MIKE MALES, CTR. ON JUVENILE &
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, UPDATE: NINE MONTHS INTo REALIGNMENT: CALIFORNIA'S PRISONER DE-
CLINE CONTINUES, NEw ADMISSIONS RISE 5 (2012), available at http://www.cjcj.org/files/
Realignment updateAug 15_2012.pdf (last visited Aug. 15, 2012).
176 It is possible that this slightly understates the effect of realignment because California's
jails were seeing slowly declining population from 2007 to mid-2011. Additional data are
posted in this Article's Technical Appendix, available at http://www.law.umich.edu/faculty
home/margoschlanger/Pages/Publications.aspx.
11 By "its own prisoners," I mean prisoners who, even after realignment, are sentenced to
state time, but whom the state nonetheless chooses to house in a county jail.
171 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 4016.5(a)(1) (West 2010).
" See Technical Appendix, supra note 176.
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reducing case processing? Or something else?s 0) This is a statistic that is
worth noting and watching carefully.
The overall story of Plata, Coleman, and California prison reform is
that the litigation is likely to succeed in prompting a politically negotiated
reduction in state prison population back to the level of 1993, necessary to
allow improvements in medical and mental health care. The question re-
mains to what extent California's realignment reforms will prompt expan-
sion, shift prisoners from the state to counties, or promote various detention
alternatives.
In the remainder of this Article, I examine two topics in greater depth:
first, the jail population orders described briefly above, and second, the po-
tential for varied litigation responses to the challenges posed by increasing
jail population.
III. JAIL POPULATION ORDERS
A. Prevalence, Origin, and the One-Prisoner-One-Bed Rule
Notwithstanding Justice Scalia's accusation of radicalism, jail and
prison population orders - imposed by federal and state trial courts during
civil rights litigation, or developed as part of court settlements - were once
commonplace.'"' Prior population caps imposed statewide, as in Plata and
Coleman, include orders in the epic prison litigations of Williams v. McK-
eithen (Louisiana), Costello v. Wainwright (Florida), and Ruiz v. Estelle
(Texas).'82 Thus, the Plata/Coleman population order is far from unprece-
dented - although as an order applicable to what was in 2009 the largest
state system, at the United States' peak in incarceration, it tops any list by
size. It is true, however, that the other statewide prison population caps
began and ended years ago: the Williams order, for example, lasted from
1983 to 1996,183 the Costello order from 1977 to 1992,184 and the Ruiz order
180 The first two hypotheses were shared with me by Ernie Galvan.
"' For lists and information about dozens of prison and jail population caps, see the Civil
Rights Litigation Clearinghouse; the collections are available at http://bit.ly/Prison-Pop-Caps,
and http://bit.ly/Jail-Pop-Caps.
182 For a full procedural history and copies of the many opinions and crucial orders in
Williams v. McKeithen, No. 71-cv-0098B (M.D. La. Mar. 26, 1971), see http://www.clearing-
house.net/detail.php?id=722; for those in Costello v. Wainwright, No. 72-cv-00109 (M.D. Fla.
Feb. 9, 1972), see http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=644; and for those in Ruiz v.
Estelle, No. 78-cv-00987 (S.D. Tex. June 1, 1978), see http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php
?id=960.
183 See Order Approving Settlement at 1-2, Williams v. McKeithen, No. 71-cv-0098B
(M.D. La. Sept. 26, 1996), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/detailDocument.phpid
=3585.
84 See Celestineo v. Singletary, 147 F.R.D. 258, 264 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
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from 1981 to 2001.'18 Apart from the Plata/Coleman order, there has not
been a new statewide prison population order in many years. Much more
typical, particularly in recent years, have been orders like those that cur-
rently apply to the jails in about a third of California's fifty-eight counties,
covering about a third of the state's jail population.' This Part discusses
those run-of-the-mill population orders, putting them in context and examin-
ing how they function in California.
Even as the Supreme Court held over thirty years ago that prison and
jail crowding do not alone violate the Constitution,17 the Court's opinions
expressly left open the path of crowding-ameliorating orders to remedy the
constitutionally cognizable problems caused by crowding. Accordingly, in
conditions of confinement cases addressing health, safety, sanitation, nutri-
tion, and the like, for pretrial detainees and convicted offenders in jails and
prisons alike, court orders have often capped the population permissibly
housed at particular incarcerative facilities or within systems. Those orders
might specify a number of prisoners, a per-prisoner space requirement
(which works out to the same thing, absent construction), or a permissible
percentage of some measure of capacity. The paragraph above cites three
major examples of prison-system population orders. While jail orders have
been mostly much lower profile, they have also been consistently more prev-
alent - and especially so in California.'88 The Plata/Coleman three-judge
district court highlighted three jail examples, in Chicago, Alabama (state-
wide, about state prisoners in county jails), and Los Angeles.'89
Orders like these are not rare now - and in the 1980s and 1990s, they
were positively commonplace throughout the country. The Department of
Justice started periodically tallying jail and prison population caps in 1983
and 1984, respectively. Table 1 sets out the resulting national and California
See Ruiz v. Johnson, 15 F. Supp. 2d 975, 995 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
6 Counting population caps is not as cut and dried as it might seem, but my research and
that of the California Board of State and Community Corrections agree on these counts. The
covered population figure depends a great deal on whether the L.A. County jail system, the
largest in America, is deemed to have a population cap or not. There is, in fact, both a numeric
cap and a "one-prisoner-one-bed" order in effect in L.A. County, but the cap is sufficiently
high that it does not seem to have any operational impact; according to plaintiffs' counsel in
Rutherford v. Block, the L.A. County jail is operationally vastly over-crowded even though its
population is well under its court-ordered population cap. Interview with Peter Eliasberg,
supra note 13. If the L.A. County jail population were included in the tally in the footnoted
text, the sentence would need to be amended to say that population orders cover well over half
the state's jail population.
187 See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347-48 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
542 (1979).
' See WAYNE N. WELSH, COUNTIES IN COURT: JAIL OVERCROWDING AND COURT-OR-
DERED REFORM 7, 161-70 (1995).
189 Opinion and Order at 28, Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. 90-cv-00529, No. 01-cv-
01351 (E.D. Cal., N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/
publiclPC-CA-0057-0032.pdf (citing Duran v. Elrod, 713 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1983); Newman
v. Alabama, 683 F.2d 1312 (1lth Cir. 1982); and Rutherford v. Pitchess, 457 F. Supp. 104
(C.D. Cal. 1978)).
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tabulations.'9 (Data on the reported age, in years, of the population orders is
available only since 1999.)
TABLE 1: PREVALENCE OF JAIL AND PRISON POPULATION CAPS,
NATIONWIDE AND IN CALIFORNIA
(a) (b) (c)
Average daily % of population Median age, if
prisoner population housed in facilities known, in years
Year w/ population cap
National California National California National California
Local 1983 227,543 40,622 30% 25%
Jails 1988 336,017 63,359 43% 77%
1993 466,155 73,711 38% 74%
1999 607,980 77,851 25% 71% 6 7
2006 757,978* 80,625* 11% 32% 8 14
State 1984 390,334 37,264 27% 16%
Prisons 1990 635,974 86,966 24% 7%
1995 909,546 123,991 17% 8%
2000 1,170,172 159,223 13% 9% 9 2
2005 1,427,781 177,500 2% 3% 11 0
* Estimate
Source: Derived from BJS jail and prison censuses; see Technical Appendix, supra note 176.
As Table 1's column (b) shows, far from being radical or even unusual, at
their reported peak in the 1980s, population orders in civil rights cases cov-
ered a very significant proportion of jail and prison facilities and population
nationwide. And they were even more prevalent in California jails. In fact,
beginning in 1988, California has been outdone on this measure on only four
occasions: in 1993 and 1999, by the District of Columbia (whose single jail
reported a population cap); in 1988, by Louisiana (whose jails were under a
statewide court order);191 and in 2006, by Arizona. 192
" The table compiles data that is suggestive, but not error free. Still, for purposes of
analyzing trends, the jail and prison censuses are basically the only credible national source.
Sources are listed in this Article's Technical Appendix, supra note 176.
191 For information on the complex Louisiana litigation, see Hamilton v. Morial, 644 F.2d
351, 354 (5th Cir. 1981) (directing that all jail and prison litigation be consolidated in the
Middle District of Louisiana); Williams v. Edwards, No. 71-cv-0098B (M.D. La. Mar. 26,
1971), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=722; see generally In re Par-
ish Prison Populations, No. 82-cv-00745 (M.D. La. Sept. 7, 1982), available at http://www.
clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=5514.
192 Table l's figures show a sharp decline in California's jail population cap coverage after
1999, from a reported 71% of population in 1999 to less than half that in 2006. This is due to
the reported end of just a few large population caps - in particular, in the nation's largest jail
system, Los Angeles. In fact, however, an error underlies the data reported to the Department
of Justice reflected in Table 1. The longstanding case Block v. Rutherford includes a popula-
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Once in place, as column (c) shows, population orders tend to exhibit
considerable staying power. Jail and prison officials may be happy to live
under a population cap nominally imposed upon them by a federal court.
This has remained true even after the 1990s, when "sunset" clauses ex-
pressly allowing defendants to seek termination of civil rights injunctive
remedies after a period of time came into vogue,193 the Supreme Court began
to emphasize that federal court injunctive orders against state and local gov-
ernments in civil rights actions should be of limited duration,194 and the
Prison Litigation Reform Act in 1996 allowed jail and prison officials to ask
courts to lift orders that were more than two years old.1'9 Clark Kelso, the
law professor who serves as the court-appointed receiver in charge of the
California prison medical system under Plata, observes that "operating with
a cap is, for corrections people, a joy; you actually can operate."' 96 In addi-
tion, as the California sheriffs' own lobbyist, Nick Warner, explains about
the population caps currently in effect for many California jails, "These caps
are hedges against liability; it's unlikely you'll see any sheriffs ask for them
to be lifted."'9 The result is that defendant prison and jail officials are often
slow to seek relief from population orders.
Yet population caps have been declining in prevalence in recent years,
even though they can last for years and even decades. Some of the decline is
attributable to the PLRA. In addition, although the Plata/Coleman order is
an obvious counterexample, population orders were more consonant with the
type of jail and prison litigation done in the 1970s and 1980s than with the
type done in the 1990s and subsequently; as the required evidentiary and
causal rigor in injunctive practice has increased, lawyers in prisoners' rights
cases have traded in "kitchen sink" approaches for much more targeted,
single- and several-issue cases. 98 Population caps are broader than most
modern prison and jail cases.
Whatever the causes, the trend is clear: population caps, even more than
other jail and prison civil rights orders, have been growing rarer. 19 How-
ever, that trend has by no means led to the extinction of such caps; as Table
1 shows, at last count, ten years after the PLRA, 11% of the nation's jail
tion cap, but it is sufficiently high that jail population is maintained well below it. 468 U.S.
576 (1984). This did not change between 1999 and 2006; all that changed was the way that
Los Angeles County answered the survey.
1" See, e.g., Thomas Bergdall, A Practitioner's Guide to Injunctive Civil Rights Settle-
ments and Consent Decrees, 531 PLI/Lrr 305, 330 (1995) (advising civil rights defendants to
include a sunset provision in any decree they negotiated); see also Glen R. Jeffes, The Thirteen
Commandments of Negotiating and Living with Consent Decrees, AM. JAILs, May-June 1990,
at 38.
194 See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489 (1992) (emphasizing "the district court's
duty to return the operations and control of schools to local authorities" and "the ultimate
objective . . . to return school districts to the control of local authorities").
'9 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1)(A) (2006).
116 Interview with Clark Kelso, supra note 13.
I" Interview with Nick Warner, supra note 13.
'9' See generally Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time, supra note 17.
"' For a table similar to Table 1, but dealing with other types of orders, see id. at 578.
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population (but only 2% of the nation's prison population) was housed in
facilities that reported a population cap. About a dozen of these population
orders, nationwide, postdate the PLRA.2m As in all litigation, these cases
have mostly settled; the Plata/Coleman order is not only by far the largest of
this new generation of population orders, it is also the only one that was
contested.
But California has not contributed to the nationwide decline in popula-
tion caps.2 01 The orders have reached and continue to cover a large portion
of county jail population. Where did these California orders come from?
The answer is several waves of litigation. In the early years of jail and
prison litigation, in the 1970s, a number of jail cases were brought by legal
services offices and the ACLU of Southern California;2 02 a second series of
cases was filed in the 1980s by the ACLU's former lawyer, John Hagar, after
he started his own law practice; and a third set by lawyers who led an advo-
cacy organization, the Prisoners' Rights Union,2 03 in the early 1990s.204 From
the 1990s to today, population cap orders from such cases have governed at
least thirty-five counties, including all but two of California's twenty largest
counties.2 05 Some of those decrees were negotiated very much in the shadow
of plaintiffs' threat of nonconsensual court orders. Others were if not pre-
cisely collusive at least much more collaborative; they functioned in large
part to bolster sheriffs' claims on county funds controlled by boards of super-
visors, and to empower, rather than coerce, sheriffs with respect to jail popu-
lation.2 06 Bill Crout, later the head of the Facility Standards and Operations
division of the California Standards Association, was the jail commander in
San Luis Obispo during one suit. He describes the prisoners' lawyer in a
case against his jail as an important ally: "John [Hagar] sued me and the
sheriff for jail conditions. He went through the jail, and said, look, you're
doing the best you can under these conditions; I'm going to get you some
2" See supra note 61.
201 See supra note 192.
202 WELSH, supra note 188, at 161-70; Interview with John Hagar, supra note 13.
203 For information on the Prisoners' Rights Union, see ERIC CUMMINS, THE RISE AND
FALL OF CALIFORNIA'S RADICAL PRISON MOVEMENT 187-220 (1994); Michael Snedeker, PRU
and the Law, THE CALIFORNIA PRISONER, June 1991, at 1, available at http://freedomarchives.
org/Documents/Finder/DOC510scans/PrisonersUnion/510.califor-
nia.prisoner.vol19.no2.Junel991.pdf.
204 I count sixteen such cases, collected at http://www.clearinghouse.net/results.php?
searchAttyOrg= 19.
205 For a collection of California jail decrees with population orders, see California Jail
Population Caps, THE CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.
net/results.php?searchSpecialCollection= 14. For sources, see Technical Appendix, supra note
176.
206 Mostly, the cases settled. As prisoners' lawyer Paul Comiskey explained: "It would
turn out to be a collaborative thing. The sheriff saw the lawsuit as a vehicle to get money from
the Board of Supervisors. And the sheriffs saw that the population limit would help them keep
control over their jail. We always put limits. Sometimes there was a kick-out order; within
90% of capacity you may, and at 100% you must, kick people out. So the sheriffs ended up
pretty happy." Interview with Paul Comiskey, supra note 13.
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resources. From that moment on, John was my best friend." 207 At least one
case was actually brought by the sheriff against the Board of Supervisors,
with no prisoner plaintiffs at all. 208
In California, what emerged from these jail conditions cases was both
the population orders themselves, and, perhaps even more important, a guid-
ing principle for California's jail population - a rule of thumb for popula-
tion control of "one prisoner, one bed" or, in an alternative phrase, "no
floor-sleepers." 20 The clearest statement of this principle was written by
Judge William P. Gray in the long-lived Orange County jail conditions case,
Stewart v. Gates.210 After a jail visit in which Judge Gray observed "several
instances in which an inmate was sleeping on his assigned mattress that had
been placed directly on the concrete floor of a cell, immediately adjacent to
the toilet, because all of the bunks were allotted to other prisoners," he
wrote: "If the public, through its judicial and penal system, finds it neces-
sary to incarcerate a person, basic concepts of decency, as well as reasonable
respect for constitutional rights, require that he be provided a bed."2 11 Judge
Gray ordered that "every prisoner kept in the jail will be accorded a mattress
and a bed or bunk upon which to sleep." 212 Several years later, in the face of
a rapidly increasing jail (and county) population, the court found the sheriff
in contempt of court and fined him, in his official capacity, $50,000 plus $10
per night "for every inmate who does not have a bed or bunk on which to
sleep the first night." 213 A population cap set at the rated capacity of the
men's main jail was imposed in the case in the 1980s (and lasted until
2005).214 In addition, "faced with the possibility the ACLU might seek to
expand the federal class action to all three county facilities, [Sheriff Gates]
put a voluntary cap on the number of inmates at the two other locations, so
each inmate there would have a bed or a bunk as well." 2 15
As an ironclad constitutional principle, one-prisoner-one-bed is a little
bit challenging (though far from impossible) to square with Rhodes v. Chap-
man.216 In that case, the Supreme Court insisted that crowding alone - in
particular, double celling (housing two prisoners in a cell meant for one by
207 Interview with Bill Crout, supra note 13. Switching sides, John Hagar represented
many of the sheriffs in the 1990s wave of litigation. He says that in most of those cases, he
would tour a crowded jail, advise the sheriff that he could not defend it, and then negotiate a
population cap. Interview with John Hagar, supra note 13.
208 See Marvin v. Cnty. of Kings, No. 01-c-0040 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 4, 2001),
available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id= 12259.
209 See, e.g., Interview with Richard Herman, supra note 13; Interview with Paul Comis-
key, supra note 13 ("The big no-no was sleeping on the floor."); see also Redman v. Cnty. of
San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1444 n.12 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Sergeant Canfield further testified that
in his opinion, the detention facility was overcrowded only if there were 'floor-sleepers."').
210 450 F. Supp. 583 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
211 Id. at 588.
212 Id. at 590.
213 Gates v. Mun. Court, 9 Cal. App. 4th 45, 49 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
214 See Pierce v. Cnty. of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 2008).
215 Gates, 9 Cal. App. 4th at 50.
216 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
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substituting a bunk bed for the planned single bed) - did not constitute
cruel and unusual punishment.217 "[D]eprivations of essential food, medical
care or sanitation," "increase[d] violence," or other "intolerable" condi-
tions were, rather, what the Constitution forbids. 218 Rhodes undermines the
authority of rules of thumb, despite their usefulness to government manag-
ers; in Rhodes, the Supreme Court was trying to insist on fact-specificity and
nuance about the consequences of violating such rules. Even so, California
criminal justice actors have long widely believed that the federal courts will
enforce the no-floor-sleepers approach against jails; the Ninth Circuit has
sometimes, if not always, confirmed this belief.2 19
Moreover, as consent decrees often do, California's jail decrees had a
strong influence on the development of professional norms and standards.22 0
In response to the litigation threat, sheriffs wanted the protection of formal
bureaucratic procedures and professional ratification.2 21 Statewide jail stan-
dards, promulgated as regulations, 222 were the result. They have no explicit
population requirements, but their rules about square footage, bedding, etc.,
mean that California's jails are to hold only as many prisoners as they can
reasonably house. 223 Even though the regulations are not enforceable, ob-
servers agree that jails work very hard to adhere to at least the population-
related standards; floor-sleepers have become rare in California's jails. 224
217 Id. at 348.
218 Id.; see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 554 (1979); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d
1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1992).
21 See Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1448 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Thomp-
son's uncontroverted allegation that he was provided with neither a bed nor even a mattress
[on two nights in jail] unquestionably constitutes a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment
claim."); see also Rhinehart v. Pima Cnty. Jail, No. 92-15488, 1992 WL 387170, at *1 (9th
Cir. 1992) (unpublished table opinion). For a long list of non-California cases holding it un-
constitutional, and a shorter list holding it constitutional, to assign jail prisoners to sleep on the
floor, see JOHN BOSTON & DANIEL MANVILLE, PRISONERS' SELF-HELP LITIGATION MANUAL
20-21 nn.114-18 (2010).
220 Interview with John Hagar, supra note 13; Interview with Gary Wion, supra note 13;
cf Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism
and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGA-
NIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 63, 69-70 (Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell eds., 1991) (origi-
nally published at 48 AM. Soc. REV. 147 (1983)) (identifying several kinds of institutional
imitation, including a "mimetic" or "modeling" process that occurs "when organizational
technologies are poorly understood, when goals are ambiguous, or when the environment cre-
ates symbolic uncertainty").
221 Interview with Gary Wion, supra note 13; see also Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions
Over Time, supra note 17, at 563.
222 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 1280 (2012); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 24, §§ 13-102, 1231
(2012).
22 See CAL. BD. OF STATE & CMTY. CORR., MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR LOCAL DETENTION
FACILrIES, TITLE 24, available at http://www.bdcorr.ca.gov/regulations/2001 regulations
guidelines/t_15_24_2001/t_24_adult/pdf version/t24_adult_0l.pdf.
224 Interview with Paul Comiskey, supra note 13; Interview with Peter Eliasberg, supra
note 13; Interview with John Hagar, supra note 13; Interview with Gary Wion, supra note 13.
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B. Implementation of the One-Prisoner-One-Bed Rule
California's jails have not been nearly as crowded as its prisons. In
fact, in recent years, their populations have only occasionally exceeded rated
capacity225 (although 10 or 15% over capacity is far from unheard of). How
have the jails avoided the state prisons' peak crowding rate of 200% of de-
sign capacity? Or, alternatively put, how have California's jails complied
with their court orders and with the one-prisoner-one-bed approach? Using
the same categories as in the section above regarding counties and realign-
ment, logically, there have been three methods: expansion, limiting admis-
sions or sentences, and releasing prisoners.
Expansion: A logically straightforward, but practically difficult, way to
deal with crowding (given a one-prisoner-one-bed rule) is simply to add
beds. This has been the prison system's approach, as illustrated by the pho-
tograph in the Introduction, supra. But in some ways, jails' population
problems are more acute than prisons', because jails often do not have the
kinds of congregate spaces that California's prisons have used as temporary
dorms, and therefore have fewer options for overflow housing. They do
sometimes figure out a way,226 but more typically, when jails get very
crowded, prisoners tend to sleep on benches in what were intended to be
reception areas or, more often, on the floor. This is precisely what a one-
prisoner-one-bed rule forbids.
Building is a straightforward, albeit an expensive and time consuming,
option. Until A.B. 900, in 2007, gave counties access to bond financing for
jail building, for over a decade California's sheriffs had had extremely lim-
ited ability to build jail bed space. Whether because of voters' unwillingness
to fund further jail expansion after the jail building boom of the 1980s, or
their disinclination to add detention facilities in their neighborhoods, jail ca-
pacity has gone up only 10% since 1990 (from 70,000227 that year to
77,271228 currently). California's rated prison capacity has grown at nearly
six times that rate, from 52,698 to 84,130 over the same period.229 The typi-
225 See MIKE MALES, CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CAN CALIFORNIA COUNTY
JAILS ABSORB Low-LEVEL STATE PRISONERS 2 TBL. 1, 3 TBL.2 (MAR. 2011), available at http://
www.cjcj.org/files/CanCalifomiaCountyJails AbsorbLow-LevelStatePrisoners.pdf.
226 See Hope Hanselman, San Luis Obispo County Jail Works to Relieve Jail Overcrowd-
ing, KSBY, May 18, 2012, http://www.ksby.com/news/san-luis-obispo-county-jail-works-to-
relieve-jail-overcrowding.
227 CAL. BD. OF CORR. AND REHAB., 1999 JAIL PROFILE SURVEY, AVERAGE DAILY POPULA-
TION (1999), available at http://www.bdcorr.ca.gov/fsod/jail%20profile%20summary/
jps-annual-rep_99/average-daily-population.htm/.
221 CAL. BD. OF STATE & CMTY. CORR., JAIL SURVEY SPREADSHEET, 2009-2011 Partial
2012 (Nov. 15, 2012) (on file with author).
229 Compare CAL. DEP' OF CORR. AND REHAB., MONTHLY REPORT OF POPULATION AS OF
MIDNIGHT DECEMBER 31, 1995 (Jan. 4, 1996), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/re-
ports researchlOffenderInformationServicesBranch/Monthly/TPOP1A/TPOPlAd9512.pdf
with CAL. DEPT OF CORR. AND REHAB., MONTHLY REPORT OF POPULATION AS OF MIDNIGHT
OCTOBER 31, 2012 (Nov. 5, 2012), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/reports-research/Of-
fenderInformationServicesBranch/Monthly/TPOPlA/TPOP1Adl210.pdf.
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cal budget issues in times of fiscal constraint are exacerbated by the division
of responsibility between sheriffs, who run the jails, and county boards of
supervisors, who fund them but do not otherwise control them. 230
Limiting admissions and sentences: Admitting fewer prisoners to jail or
admitting prisoners for less time obviously reduces crowding. Ordinarily,
this depends on judges' acquiescence, using adjustments to bail, diversion, or
sentencing. The politics here are not easy. California's municipal and supe-
rior court judges, who are elected, frequently want to insure that prisoners
are not released. And sheriffs share that law-and-order orientation: To quote
one senior sheriffs department officer, a deputy chief from San Bernardino
County, "We didn't get into the business in order to find ways to release
people.... We are in the business of figuring out how to arrest, convict and
keep people in jail . . .. "2 Still, sheriffs are simultaneously responsible for
maintaining jail conditions and organizationally liable for failures in that
responsibility. So sheriffs are more likely than judges to want to ease up on
bail or sentencing - especially if they can pin responsibility for that deci-
sion on someone else. Sheriffs who have good understandings with their
county judges can ask them to ease bonding requirements (especially greater
use of release on recognizance, rather than money bond), shorten misde-
meanor sentences, or make other types of accommodations.232 In combina-
tion, such measures can help control population.
Often, however, judicial accommodations are not forthcoming. In
Santa Clara County, for example, when county jails were the subject of a
late 1980s state court consent decree that included a population cap, in Bran-
son v. Winter,233 the sheriffs captain who ran Santa Clara's jail "found him-
self in constant conflict with the courts because he had to release 'hundreds
of inmates . . . for no other reason than we didn't have a bed to put them
in.'"234 One way this was done was through a sheriff-implemented bail re-
form: instead of admitting anyone whose bail had been set at some specified
low level, the sherriff released such potential prisoners on their own recogni-
zance. When the recognizance point was set at $1,000 or less, the state
criminal judges would, according to the jail captain's testimony years later,
"start setting bail ... at twelve hundred." The effect was iterative: "I recall
230 See, e.g., Cnty. of Butte v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. App. 3d 693, 695 (1985).
231 Flaccus, supra note 174.
2 32 See, e.g., Brian Bullock, Santa Barbara, San Luis Obispo County Jails Feeling Effects
of AB 109, LomPoc REcoRD, May 22, 2012, http://www.lompocrecord.com/news/local/govt-
and-politics/santa-barbara-san-luis-obispo-county-jails-feeling-effects-of/article_2ad5752e-
a3d5-1 lel-8acb-0019bb2963f4.html.
233 No. 78807 (Cal. Super. Ct., filed Mar. 27, 1981), available at http://www.clearing-
house.net/detail.php?id=45; see also Fisher v. Winter, 564 F. Supp. 281, 300 (N.D. Cal. 1983)
(governing women's jail and requiring that no prisoner be assigned to sleep on the floor).
234 See People ex rel. Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 49 Cal. App. 4th
1471, 1485 (1996).
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when we set it at twenty-five hundred dollars, we started getting bail
amounts of twenty-five hundred and one." 235
Prisoner releases: The final and, in California, seemingly the most im-
portant method of jail population control is simply releasing prisoners -
pretrial and sentenced. Unlike the Plata/Coleman population order, under
which no California prisoner has been or will be released early, jail orders
are cited, monthly, to justify the early release of thousands of pretrial and
sentenced prisoners from county jails. As Figure 2, below, shows, the peak
of releases took place in 1996, when jails released over 27,000 prisoners per
month; during a second peak, in 2005, releases averaged about 20,000 per
month. In 2011, releases averaged about 10,000 per month, and preliminary
information suggests they may be trending up again in 2012.236 California
has not seen the type of "third-wave" bail reform23 7 that a few jurisdictions
have implemented, which holds down bail requirements to avoid incarcera-
tion based on inability to pay, rather than risk of flight or to public safety.238
And, as noted in section II.D, supra, pretrial detainees in California consti-
tute over 70% of the state's jail population, well above the national average
of 60%, which is itself extremely high by comparison with historical
figures. 23 9 Pretrial releases are basically an ad hoc, county-by-county bail
reform method; prisoners who have been given low bails that they nonethe-
less cannot meet because of their financial circumstances are released any-
way. Releases of sentenced prisoners function a little differently; they tend
to mean that nonviolent misdemeanants do very little time. (Realignment
newly empowers sheriffs to release not only misdemeanants 240 but also the
235 Id.
236 For full data on jail prisoner releases, see Technical Appendix, supra note 176. For
more discussion of preliminary 2012 trends, see infra Table 3, which is derived from the
California Board of State and Community Corrections jail surveys.
237 The first wave, in the 1960s, sought to end arbitrary pretrial detention, with its resulting
high rate of pretrial incarceration for poor defendants in urban jails. The second wave, begin-
ning in the 1970s, introduced formal determinations of future dangerousness into the calculus.
Like other observers, I label the most recent set of reforms a third wave. See Timothy R.
Schnacke et al., The Third Generation of Bail Reform, DENv. U. L. REv. ONLINE (Mar. 14,
2011), http://www.denverlawreview.org/online-articles/2011/3/14/the-third-generation-of-bail-
reform.html. For documentation of the current state of the debate, see OFFICE OF JUSTICE PRO-
GRAMS AND THE PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., NATL SYMPOSIUM ON PRETRIAL JUSTICE: SUMMARY
REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS 14-17 (2011), available at http://www.pretrial.org/NSPJ%20Report
%20201 1.pdf.
238 For description of the situation in California and of a bail reform bill currently under
consideration, see BRIAN HELLER DE LEON, CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, TESTI-
MONY TO THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE (Apr. 24, 2012), available at http://sjsujusticestudies.
net/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/SB-Il 80-Pretrial-TestimonyFinal l.pdf.
239 See Technical Appendix, supra note 176; OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, supra note
237, at 11-12 (charts submitted by James Austin).
240 Misdemeanor charges tend to be low profile, so early releases of misdemeanants are
not very politically visible (unless the misdemeanant is someone like Lindsay Lohan, see Ken
Lee, Lindsay Lohan Released From Jail, PEOPLE MAG., Aug. 2, 2010; Ken Lee, Lindsay Lohan
Checks In and Out of Jail, PEOPLE MAG., Nov. 7, 2011, http://www.people.com/people/article/
0,,20543204,00.html).
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non-non-non felons, but presumably these latter offenders will continue to
do more time.)
FIGURE 2: CALIFORNIA JAL RELEASES PER MONTH, 1995-2012
30,000 r--- --- -- _ -
-Total
- Released per month: sentenced
Released per month: pretrial
...........  . ... .........
0
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
Source: Cal. Bd. of State and Cmty. Corr., see Technical Appendix, supra note 176.
2011
Table 2 provides more detail for recent years. In each year shown in
Table 2, releases have totaled between 11 and 14% of admissions. Each
year, a majority have occurred pretrial.
TABLE 2: MorHLY PRISONER RELEASES FROM CALIFORNIA JAILS
Prisoner releases per month
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Booked per Total Pretrial No court- Sentenced No court-
month prisoners ordered cap prisoners ordered cap
(% of (% of
Year pretrial) sentenced)
2008 107,042 15,294 8,332 4% 6,962 12%
2009 101,153 14,465 8,199 4% 6,266 15%
2010 96,391 11,950 6,987 5% 4,963 7%
2011 88,551 10,196 6,649 7% 3,547 14%
Source: See Cal. Bd. of State and Cmty. Corr. 241
2' See supra note 228. For Table 2, I adjusted the data to reflect that Orange County in
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The result of releases can be explicit confrontation: Again, in Santa Clara,
where Branson v. Winter's 1981 decree included a population order, the
sheriff s captain
was called into the chambers of the presiding judge who was upset
over the number of release orders he was asked to approve, and he
said he was very concerned about the release, didn't want it to
happen. And I said, well, I don't really have a choice. And he
says, well, I don't want them released. And I said, well, are you
saying that you're now going to take over the Branson case? He
said no. I said, well, then I'm going to release them. If you want
to hold me in contempt, please do so, we'll go to court. But I have
no choice.2 42
The Santa Clara judge did not proceed with a contempt charge, but if he
had, this medium-grade conflict might have escalated considerably, to all-
out war. One war along these lines that occurred twenty years ago remains
salient among California's sheriffs, county counsels, and other criminal jus-
tice actors. In Orange County in the early 1990s, Sheriff Brad Gates (having
already been held in contempt several years before in federal district court
for failing to provide beds for jail prisoners) was nearly whipsawed by con-
tempt sanctions imposed by the Central Orange County Municipal Court for
releasing eighteen prisoners not ordinarily eligible under California law for
release on a citation following arrest,2 43 in violation of routine individual
orders assigning the particular criminal defendants to the sheriffs custody.
The municipal court not only fined Sheriff Gates $17,000, it sentenced him
to thirty days confinement in his own jail. The municipal court's presiding
judge explained that he needed "to protect now the ability of the Court to
enforce its own orders," and that his court had the "inherent power to coerce
other branches to give it the ability to enforce its orders." Reviewing the
contempt convictions, the superior court vacated them; this view was upheld
by the court of appeal.244
Things got similarly heated recently in Fresno, when, in 2010, Sheriff
Margaret Mims shut down three floors of the county jail, substantially re-
ducing capacity, because her budget would not allow her to staff both the jail
and patrol. The Board of Supervisors refused to allocate any additional
funds and ordered her office to restore the jail staff; unable to resolve the
issue, she sued in state court and won a preliminary injunction, enabling her
to carry out the layoffs.2 45 The lawsuit has stretched on ever since, and the
resultant bad blood has had significant effects - for example, prompting the
242 People ex rel. Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1471,
1485 (1996).
243 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 827.1 (West 2010).
244 Gates v. Mun. Court of Orange Cnty., 9 Cal. App. 4th 45, 51 (1992).
245 Theresa Freed, Legal Victory for Sherff Margaret Mims, KSEE24 NEWS, July 30, 2010,
http://www.ksee24.com/news/local/89738517.html. See also Mims v. Cnty. of Fresno Bd. of
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county's Community Corrections Partnership (which is responsible for allo-
cating realignment money) publicly to consider funding a facility other than
the county jail in order to gain more control over early releases.2 46 As the
Fresno Bee described, "The infighting has ... hamstrung the ability of local
leaders to work collaboratively on law-enforcement issues, such as jail over-
crowding and early releases of inmates."2 47
Other times the state courts themselves implement releases.2 48 In Or-
ange County, the California State Court of Appeal, after roundly criticizing
the municipal court for holding the sheriff in contempt for conduct induced
by federal law and a federal court order, praised the superior court's presid-
ing judge, "who has continually cooperated with the sheriff and issued ap-
propriate orders authorizing release of prisoners when necessary."2 49
Whether judges will cooperate with sheriffs in prisoner releases turns on
factors ranging from personal relationships, to, for example, the conserva-
tism or liberalism of the electorate or the sheriffs popularity.
The authorizing source of law for jail prisoner releases varies. Some-
times the answer is a state or federal court order from a civil rights case.250
But the one-prisoner-one-bed approach, attributed as it is to federal law, em-
powers sheriffs even without a court order. As the California Court of Ap-
peals held in 1998, about Orange County's Sheriff Gates,
If it was unconstitutional to force inmates in the men's main jail to
sleep on the floor, a reasonable person would conclude it was also
unconstitutional at the two other facilities, even if a federal court
had not yet said so in a formal order. It is regrettable conditions in
the main jail deteriorated to a point of warranting federal interven-
tion. It would be more regrettable if we compounded the problem
by holding that Gates should manage branch jails in a way he
could not lawfully manage the main jail.251
Table 2's columns (d) and (f) show the proportion of released prisoners
who are not affected by a court order. (That is, the prisoners referenced in
Supervisors, No. 10CEC00528 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Feb. 11, 2010), available at http://www.
clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id= 12226.
246 See Kurtis Alexander, Fresno Jail May Not Get Funds as Panel Looks at Coalinga
Facility, FRESNO BEE, May 14, 2012, at Al.; Kurtis Alexander, Funds OK'd to Open Floorf in
Fresno County Jail, FRESNO BEE, May 25, 2012, at A3.
247 Kurtis Alexander, Sheriff Mims' lawsuit costing Fresno County $450,000, FRESNO BEE,
May 10, 2012, at Al.
248 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 4024.1 (West 2012) (providing for sheriff application to
the superior court presiding judge to receive authorization for early releases for thirty days at a
time, and detailing how such releases should proceed).
9 Gates, 9 Cal. App. 4th at 59 n.l1.
250 See, e.g., Letter from San Diego Cnty. Sheriff William B. Kolender to Susan Hubbard,
Dir., Div. of Adult Inst., Cal. Dep't of Corr. and Rehab. (May 5, 2009), available at http://
acreentry.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/07letter-from-san-diego-sheriff_- 050509.pdf. For in-
formation on Hudler v. Duffy, No. 404148 (Cal. Super. Ct., filed 1977), see http://www.
clearinghouse.net/detail.phpid=46.
21 Gates, 9 Cal. App. 4th at 55.
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columns (d) and (f) have been released from jails in which no court order is
extant.) While a large majority of releases have been undertaken pursuant to
judicially ratified population caps, 5 to 7% of the pretrial prisoner releases
and 7 to 15% of the sentenced prisoner releases occurred in jurisdictions
with no known relevant court order. While thirty-eight of California's fifty-
eight counties report that limited capacity has forced them to release prison-
ers at some point in the past several years,2 52 only a small majority of these
have a court order to point to. It turns out not to make all that much differ-
ence, legally, whether a court order exists or not. California has a formal
county parole system,253 but even wholly apart from that, California sheriffs
have successfully asserted the authority to implement release policies on
their own, and the standards used for release may, as they were in Santa
Clara County during the conflict described above, be "far more lenient than
the standards of the county board of parole."254
Thus, the difference between having a court order and not having one is
largely political rather than legal. Before realignment, Dick Herman, one of
the lawyers who litigated the 1990s wave of jail court orders, explains, "the
smart counties kept the population caps, so the sheriff could say, 'the federal
judge made me release these prisoners.'" Asked whether things are chang-
ing because of realignment, his answer is that sheriff discretion may have
expanded, but the politics of prisoner-release orders remain perilous: "Now,
counties that chafe under federal orders can get rid of them. Realignment
has, they think, given them authority to release everyone. . . . They don't
need the court-ordered caps anymore." Even so, he continues, there remains
a reason to keep court orders in place: "If they blame the releases on realign-
ment, the judges will go to the legislature," 255 which might well then legis-
late away the sheriffs' discretion.
But what about realignment? Table 2 showed that releases were down
in 2011. But Table 3 presents the partial four months of data available post-
realignment (2012, quarter 1); these data suggest the picture may be
changing.
252 See Technical Appendix, supra note 176, for a county-by-county breakdown. My tally
is based on tabulated releases since 2008. See CAL. BD. OF STATE & CMTY. CORR., supra note
228.
253 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3074-89 (West 2010).
254 People ex rel. Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1471,
1485 (1996).
255 Interview with Richard Herman, supra note 13.
2092013]
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
TABLE 3: POPULATION RELEASES IN 2012
(PARTIAL DATA: SOME JAILS ONLY)
(a) (b) (c)
Est. % of Jail Population related % increase, compared to the
Population releases/month same jails in 2011
Reporting Total Pretrial Early Total Pretrial Early
Jan. 72% 9,248 5,798 3,450 21% 5.2% 38.4%
Feb. 66% 5,645 2,759 2,886 38% 10.6% 43.4%
Mar. 60% 5,868 2,745 3,123 44% 17.8% 42.2%
Apr. 34% 3,264 2,063 1,201 25% 1.0% 53.0%
Source: Technical Appendix, supra note 176 (presenting updated data).
The data are partial; the fraction of jail population held by counties that have
so far reported is listed by month in column (a). The crucial columns are the
last three, labeled (c); they are based on a comparison of releases by the
counties that have so far reported 2012 releases to releases in those same
counties in the same month, one year earlier. As Table 3 shows, for counties
that have so far provided data, releases are up considerably compared to
2011 - although still nowhere near the peak that occurred in 2007. The
effects are beginning to attract media notice.256
IV. CONCLUSION: THE HYDRA THREAT AND JAIL LITIGATION
I will conclude with some speculations about what happens next: I
think the answer is jail litigation. The ever-present risk of realignment is
that it could turn the PlatalColeman court order into a shell game instead of
a solution to California's incarceration-conditions problem. Medical and
mental health care in California's prisons was indisputably horrendous, but
population reduction is finally allowing the other substantive parts of the
remedies to work. This achievement would be far less significant if the or-
der turned out to dump on the counties not just population, but the unconsti-
tutional conditions that, in California's prisons, accompanied population.
Call this the potential hydra problem: chopping the head off of unconstitu-
tional prison conditions could cause many of the fifty-eight counties to, in
turn, develop unconstitutional conditions of jail confinement. I do not mean
this metaphor to denigrate what seems to me to be the substantial civil rights
achievements of Plata and Coleman. The hydra's new heads are likely to
threaten the welfare of fewer prisoners, or threaten them less, than the old
one did. But the hydra problem remains important.
Lead plaintiffs' counsel in Plata, Don Specter, says that this risk is very
real: "In some ways, realignment has done what the sheriffs feared: moving
" See, e.g., Bullock, supra note 232 (describing increase in early releases and electronic
monitoring in San Luis Obispo and Santa Barbara).
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problems from the prisons to the jails. Especially health care." 257 The jail
situation is worsened, moreover, by the fact that jail policies and practices
are generally geared towards short-term stays, but realignment will push
more long-term prisoners into county jails. For such longer-term prisoners,
county time may feel worse than state time: to quote my own prior gross
generalizations, "jails are more dangerous than prisons" as well as "more
chaotic"; "jail routines are less regular, jail time is more idle, and jail in-
mates are more likely to be in some kind of crisis."25 8 Sheriffs' lobbyist
Nick Warner says that there are now dozens of jail prisoners sentenced to
more than ten years of county time. "Think about the inmates," he says.
"We don't have yard space for these people. We don't have medical, mental
health, recreation." The potential for disaster is very present: Speaking of
his sheriff clients, Warner continues, "We said we're willing to be part of the
solution, but we're not set up for this. We aren't good places for people to
spend so much time in."259
The challenges are both regulatory and informational. In terms of regu-
lation, the statewide jail standards have some influence, but (as discussed in
section III.A) they are hortatory. And even if followed to the letter, they are
part of a jail environment that is set up for short-term prisoners. (To cite just
one of many possible examples, California jail regulations require just three
hours per week of access to exercise space,260 in which large-muscle activity
is possible; this is, to my mind, too limited even for short-term prisoners, but
for long-term stays, it is well below what even state prisoners in punitive
segregation, much less in general population, typically receive.) Other soft
regulatory methods - data collection, sharing of best practices, and the like
- are essentially unfunded and therefore unavailable.2 61 In terms of current
information, Barry Krisberg explains that local control and jail dispersal
augment the challenge:
It's kind of hard to get your arms around what's really going
on.... There is no body, no structure, no entity that has any way
to know what's going on at the county level.2 62
So how can the hydra problem be minimized? Three answers seem to
be emerging in California: expansion, decarceration, and litigation. This
257 Interview with Don Specter, supra note 13.
258 See Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, supra note 25, at 1686-87.
259 Interview with Nick Warner, supra note 13.
260 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 1006 (2012) (defining "exercise" to mean "physical
exertion of large muscle groups"); id at § 1065 (requiring minimum of three hours of exercise
distributed over seven days).
261 Interview with Michael Bien, supra note 13. As Anjuli Verma pointed out to me,
however, there are ongoing efforts to collect and standardize county data relevant to realign-
ment through the Board of State Community Corrections, California State Association of
Counties, and the Chief Probation Officers of California (CPOC), as well as through a non-
profit group called California Forward. It is possible some of these will make headway.
262 Interview with Barry Krisberg, supra note 13.
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Article has already discussed at some length current hints of a new jail build-
ing boom. And I have discussed, as well, the one-prisoner-one-bed rule,
population caps, and the resulting decarceration techniques. Ideally, these
techniques would have a foundation in some kind of evidence-based classifi-
cation instrument. Michael Bien describes this as "a real opportunity to do
criminal justice reform, with a side benefit of improving conditions of
confinement."2 63
Another response is also emerging: litigation, which Part III, above,
demonstrates functions as a routine and ever-present part of the California
criminal justice ecosystem. Corrections Secretary Matt Cate says, for exam-
ple, that he is confident that given their flexibility and their new realignment
money, most counties will be able "to handle those challenges if not more
effectively than the state, at least more quickly." But, he continues: "If it's
alleged that treatment of inmates is so poor as to violate the Constitution, I
have no doubt that the plaintiffs' bar will zealously advocate to get those
violations addressed." 26
But of course litigation fixes are not so easy, in jail as elsewhere. Cali-
fornia jail litigation is unfolding in three arenas: new jail litigation, existing
prison litigation, and existing jail litigation:
New jail litigation: All observers project that new jail litigation will
increase as realignment matures. Barry Krisberg, for example, says that
given poor jail conditions, "lawsuits are inevitable, and the counties kind of
know it; they are expecting for the shoe to drop on this stuff." 265 But in
some ways, jail litigation is even more difficult than prison litigation - not
only are jails, like prisons, hidden behind their walls, but jails are much
more dispersed than prisons. California has fifty-eight counties, many with
multiple jails, and each with its own practices, compared to its thirty-three
state prisons, run by one agency, with one budget and one set of rules. I do
not mean to exaggerate this effect: as in most states, California's jail popula-
tion is concentrated in a few large counties (80% of the state's jail capacity is
in fifteen counties).2 66 But even so, jail dispersal strains the bar's capacity to
bring jail cases.
At one time, legal services lawyers were effective jail litigators; they
were as dispersed as jails, and they had deep connections with the communi-
ties that send prisoners to jail. But those days vanished in the 1980s when
Congress banned groups that accept Legal Services Corporation funding
from representing prisoners. 267 It is hard for other civil rights lawyers even
to know what goes on in the jails in fifty-eight counties, much less to sue
them all. Still, the ACLU of Southern California has over the past several
years substantially increased its work on jail conditions in Los Angeles -
263 Interview with Michael Bien, supra note 13.
264 Id.
265 Interview with Barry Krisberg, supra note 13.
26 CAL. BD. OF STATE & CMTY. CORR., supra note 228.
267 See Schlanger, Beyond the Hero Judge, supra note 17, at 2019.
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the nation's largest jail system - not only in its longstanding crowding liti-
gation, Rutherford v. Block, but also in two new class action lawsuits dealing
with violence and disability discrimination. 26 8 And, in what is likely a sign
of things to come, the Prison Law Office has just filed its first jail case in
many years, in Fresno. The complaint alleges life-threatening failures to
provide medical and mental health care, and to protect prisoners who are ill
or have disabilities from harm by other prisoners. 26 9 That is, it makes allega-
tions that echo the subject matter of Plata, Coleman, and Armstrong, but this
time just in Fresno County.
It is worth emphasizing that new jail litigation is far less likely than
prior cases to lead new population orders. The PLRA's provisions - the
procedural requirement of a three-judge court and of failed nonpopulation
orders as a precedent; the broad intervention rules; the difficultly of settling
without a concession of liability, etc. - make the one-prisoner-one-bed ap-
proach difficult to enforce in federal court. As Bill Crout explains: "The
PLRA has shackled litigation, including litigation that would be very wel-
come to sheriffs themselves." 27 0
So the Los Angeles and Fresno cases and others like them are likely to
focus on improving conditions, rather than decarceration. This will substan-
tially change litigation dynamics because sheriffs will gain less and lose
more from litigation - they will not be able to attribute prisoner releases to
court orders, and compliance with any remedial orders will take time,
money, and effort. Still, this is a pattern familiar from all the states that have
seen less jail population regulation than California. Assuming that such
cases are strong (as I do assume in both litigations - class counsel are
excellent and experienced lawyers who are unlikely to be wasting their own
time with weak cases), there remain reasons to settle and promising remedial
approaches.
Existing prison litigation: As jails become even more consequential -
and more crowded - criminal justice sites, California's existing prison liti-
gation could in various ways expand to encompass jails. So far, nobody is
arguing that the actual substantive provisions of the Coleman and Plata or-
ders will apply to the jails as they admit people who used to be state prison-
ers. This approach would not, however, be unprecedented. Plata's
substantive orders continue to protect California prisoners who have been
268 Interview with Peter Eliasberg, supra note 13. See Rutherford v. Block, No. 75-cv-
04111 (C.D. Cal. filed Feb. 9, 1975), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id
=5500; see also Rosas v. Baca, No. 12-cv-00428 (C.D. Cal. filed Jan. 18, 2012) (violence),
available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id= 12126; Johnson v. L.A. Cnty. Sher-
iff's Dep't, No. 08-cv-03515 (C.D. Cal. filed May 29, 2008) (disability), available at http://
www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id= 10962.
269 See Hall v. Mims, No. I1-cv-02047 (E.D. Cal. filed Dec. 13, 2011), available at http://
www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id= 11682.
270 Interview with Bill Crout, supra note 13.
2013] 213
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
sent out-of-state. 271 And Judge Wilken has held, in an order in Armstrong
currently on appeal, that the State remains responsible for compliance with
the case's disability-related remedial orders when the State uses jail facilities
to house prisoners awaiting parole-revocation hearings.272 The difference is
that the realigned county prisoners are serving new terms, pursuant to new
sentences under new statutes. This is, however, less true for the recommit-
ted parole violators, who are admitted to county jails on sentences pro-
nounced under the pre-realignment regime. Perhaps plaintiffs' counsel will
attempt to make something of that distinction.
More immediately relevant, however, is Armstrong itself, along with
yet another class action, Valdivia,27 1 which are both, like Plata and Coleman,
being litigated by the Prison Law Office and Rosen, Bien, Galvan &
Grunfeld. Under Valdivia and Armstrong, plaintiffs' counsel have for several
years monitored decree compliance in parole-revocation hearings conducted
in county jails. And a recent order in Armstrong gives plaintiffs' counsel
substantial additional access to jail grounds and policies, as well as to pris-
oners' grievances, in order to monitor decree compliance, with attorney's
fees funded by the state.2 74 If the Armstrong order is not reversed by the
Ninth Circuit during its pending appeal, that access gives plaintiffs' counsel
insight into what is actually going on in the jails. The State and counties are
fighting hard against that order. Armstrong's lead counsel Michael Bien ex-
plains, "Although we have been monitoring CDCR activities in county jails
in Armstrong and Valdivia for many years, realignment has put greater pres-
sure and focus on the jails. So now the county officials are asking Jerry
Brown, 'What the hell is going on? You're letting the plaintiffs' lawyers into
our houses."' 275 The point is not that the Armstrong or Valdivia litigations
themselves will regulate jail conditions, but that the visibility they provide as
a side benefit goes some distance towards solving the litigation challenge
271 The Plata receiver's "Turnaround Plan of Action" includes oversight of medical care
provided to CDCR prisoners housed in "out-of-state, community correctional, or re-entry fa-
cilities," to "ensure compliance with remedial orders of the federal courts . . . ." J. CLARK
KELSO, ACHIEVING A CONsTrrurIONAL LEVEL OF MEDICAL CARE IN CALIFORNIA PRISONS: THE
FEDERAL RECEIVER'S TURNAROUND PLAN OF ACTION 19 (June 6, 2008), available at http://
www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-CA-0018-0076.pdf.
272 See Amended Order Granting Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion to Require Defendants to
Track and Accommodate Needs of Armstrong Class Members Housed in County Jails, Ensure
Access to a Grievance Procedure, and to Enforce 2001 Permanent Injunction at 18, Armstrong
v. Brown, No. 94-cv-02307 (N.D. Cal. 2012), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/
chDocs/publiclPC-CA-0001-0021.pdf; see also Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, 622 F.3d 1058,
1063 (9th Cir. 2010) ("[D]efendants are responsible for providing reasonable accommoda-
tions to the disabled prisoners and parolees that they house in county jails.").
273 No. 94-cv-00671 (E.D. Cal. filed May 2, 1994), available at http://www.clearinghouse.
net/detail.php?id=9465.
274 See Amended Order at 1, Armstrong v. Brown, No. 94-cv-02307 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11,
2012), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-CA-0001-0021.pdf; Inter-
view with Michael Bien, supra note 13.
275 Interview with Michael Bien, supra note 13.
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jails pose by their diffusion and their hiddenness. All this could, however,
change in the Ninth Circuit.
Existing jail litigation: The final possibility involves existing jail litiga-
tion - in particular, the 1990s jail decrees that include population caps. For
a few of these - notably the ACLU's Los Angeles case - litigation has
remained active.276 But in most of the cases, the prisoners were represented
by the Prisoners' Rights Union, which subsequently became, as one of its
own members admits, "defunctish."277 Over the last decade, the plaintiffs'
lawyers who litigated these cases have let them languish unenforced, orphan
decrees whose major function has been to empower sheriffs vis-A-vis their
boards of supervisors and county courts. But it would be possible for the
lawyers who negotiated those decrees to revive the cases. And in fact, this
has recently happened in Plumas County, and, more complicatedly, in Or-
ange County. The Orange County case marked the path: even though plain-
tiffs' counsel's efforts to preserve a 1980s-era decree failed, the end result
after consolidation with an ADA jail case was a trial that plaintiffs won278 -
after which they were awarded $3 million in attorneys' fees. After nearly
twenty years of nonenforcement, Paul Comiskey and Dan Stormer, prison-
ers' counsel in the remaining dozen or so Prisoners' Rights Union cases,
report that they have recently decided to try to revive all of them - con-
ducting jail tours and filing appropriate enforcement motions.27 9 Resource
constraints mean that the work will be difficult, Stormer says, although it is
possible that courts will authorize attorneys' fees for monitoring the extant
orders. But for this kind of push to materialize, it will require building a
coalition of lawyers around the state, and the work is just beginning.28 0
In short, in response to both realignment's increasing pressure on
county jails and the improvements to conditions in state prisons driven by
Plata, Coleman, and Armstrong, the California prisoners' rights bar is mobil-
izing to attack unlawful jail conditions on several fronts. If the hydra
sprouts three or four or five new heads, these three approaches can probably
manage that. Fifty-eight heads is a different story. In that event, Don Spec-
ter says, "I don't know what happens next, unless someone like me spends
the next thirty years litigating in county jails."11
276 Rutherford v. Block, No. 75-cv-041 11 (C.D. Cal. filed Dec. 9 1975), available at http:/
/www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id= 5500.
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278 See Pierce v. Orange County, No. 01-cv-00981 (C.D. Cal. filed Oct. 18, 2001), availa-
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(C.D. Cal. filed Sep. 11, 1975), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id= 10
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